Educational Policy Formation in
Loosely
Coupled Systems:
Some Salient Features of
Guatemala's Public and
Private School Sectors
Carlos R. Ruano
El Bosque University
Bogota, Colombia
Citation: Ruano, C. R. (July 13, 2003). Educational policy formation in loosely
coupled systems: Some salient features of Guatemala's public and
private school sectors. Education Policy Analysis Archives,
11(21). Retrieved [date] from
http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v11n21/.
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Abstract
The purpose of this article is to analyze the
formulation and implementation of educational policy processes in
relation to private schools in Guatemala. Specifically, how
bilingual education is defined and implemented in the private
education sector in Guatemala City where the largest number of
privately run establishments exist. Given the great deficits in
the provision of educational coverage in the public sector, there
has been an explosive expansion of private institutions which
have very different levels of quality. Through an analysis of the
administrative processes within the Guatemalan Government in
general and its Education Ministry in particular as well as of
the governance arrangements existing in the private school
sector, an overall view of the curricular and policy decisions
taken by private schools in the formulation and implementation of
bilingual education is presented. This study was based on a
sample of six private schools which cater to higher income
segments of Guatemala City’s student population. Some of
the relevant findings of this study include, the existence of a
situation of quasi autonomous institutional functioning of the
private sector, extreme differentials in the quality of services
provided, inadequate levels of teacher and school
administrator’s training as well as lack of cooperation
between public and private sector schools.
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Introduction
Many researchers of Education are familiar with
Guatemala’s multilingual and multicultural traits. That is
to say, the presence of large Maya and Spanish speaking
populations plus the smaller Garífuna and Xinca linguistic
groups. Much less is known, however, about the internal dynamics
of Guatemala’s educational system particularly in relation
to the formulation and implementation of bilingual education
policy in privately run schools. In a country of some 10 million
inhabitants and a landmass about the size of Switzerland, there
are some 22 indigenous languages spoken by half of the
population. Nevertheless, this rich cultural diversity is
strikingly absent from the school curricula in the private
schools (England 1998, Artiles 1995). One goal of this article is
to investigate the process of bilingual curriculum formulation
and implementation in order to understand the sociolinguistic
choices made at the school level. Another goal is to analyze the
internal governance processes within the country’s
education apparatus and their relation to the salient bilingual
education curricular and linguistic arrangements deployed by
those schools which are privately run.
To accomplish these goals, this article is divided
in five sections. First, a sociopolitical overview of the
conditions where the education system evolved is given. Secondly,
a review of the legislative process within the Guatemalan State
is presented including the general legislative framework in
relation to educational policy. This refers to the interactions
between the main lawmaking body, the National Congress and the
Presidential or Executive level of decision making. The third
point consists of a description of the Guatemalan
government’s administrative mechanisms. Such description is
given in order to understand the flow of decision making
processes within the bureaucratic structures.
This segment also addresses the role played by the Ministry of
Education or MINEDUC from an administrative standpoint in the
shaping and execution of educational policies and the
differential outcomes that Ministerial decisions have for private
education institutions. The fourth aspect of this research deals
with research design issues such as methodology, fieldwork
conditions and the establishments selected for this study. The
fifth point is an analysis of the salient characteristics of
private bilingual education institutions that cater to higher
income population in Guatemala City including their governance,
financial, curricular and parental involvement aspects. Lastly,
the appropriate conclusions are presented.
For purposes of this analysis, private
institutions of education (known as Colegios Privados in
Guatemala) are defined as those which are for the most part
organizationally and financially self-sustaining. Furthermore,
the term bilingual education is used to denote schools in which
most of the learning activities are conducted in two languages.
To this author’s knowledge, not a single private school
which caters to the middle and higher income segments of the
population in Guatemala City defines bilingualism as the
inclusion of Maya languages in its curriculum alongside Spanish.
For these establishments, bilingual education is regarded as the
teaching of Spanish in addition to another European language,
generally English.
Private schools located outside of Guatemala City
were not analyzed as part of this research due to the fact that
the overwhelming majority of establishments of this kind are
located there: Guatemala City concentrates over 80% of all
private schools in the country (Revista Cronica 1997, Revista
Proceso 1998). Lastly, the analysis is centered around schools
that cater to the Primary and Secondary Levels. The latter is
further divided into Lower Secondary and Higher Secondary or
Vocational Track students.
That is to say, those between 7 and 17 years old. The majority
of enrolments take place within this age band. While some
initiatives are being implemented in terms of bilingual education
in Indigenous Maya languages particularly in rural areas, (Enge
& Chesterfield, 1996), such initiatives are still in their
early stages and cannot be compared with the practices reviewed
here.
Sociopolitical overview
We live in a blind, repressive society with brutal coercion
and instinctive passion rather than reason as its guiding
principles. In our social environment injustice and lack of
respect are the norm while a Neanderthal contempt for ideas
dominates us all. (Note 1)
You needn’t kill everyone to complete the job...[During
the 1980's] We instituted Civil Affairs which provides
development for 70% of the population while we kill 30%. (Note 2)
Politically, Guatemala, is organized on a
republican system with an Executive or Presidential branch, the
Legislative or Congressional arm and the judiciary. Both
Executive and Legislative branches are elected simultaneously for
a period of four years. By law, the Executive is forbidden from
seeking re-election.
Congress is made up of some sixty deputies from
all 22 Departments who are also elected to a four-year term.
There are no term limitations for deputies. As the legislative
branch, Congress either passes laws proposed by its members or by
the President who can veto any laws passed. With the exception of
the short-lived Serrano government (1990-1993), there has never
been a congressional majority made up of deputies from a party
different than that which controls the Presidency. Therefore, a
Presidential veto is never reversed. This form of government with
different political parties alternating in the exercise of power
via the electoral process is relatively new. Nevertheless, as
recently as 1993, the inability to govern from a divided powers
perspective was illustrated during J. Serrano’s Presidency
, when antagonism between Congress and the Executive resulted in
an attempt by the Executive to abolish Congress and to impose
rule by decree, Caudillo style. The attempt to shut down Congress
failed and Serrano was forced to flee the country.
For the most part of its existence as an
independent State, the country has been ruled by a series of
strong men or Caudillos. The Caudillo is a persistent feature of
Guatemala's sociopolitical landscape. Since Independence from
Spain in 1821, with brief respites of democratically elected
governments, Caudillos have been the standard feature of
Guatemala's Presidential system of government. between 1837 and
1944, four Caudillos ruled the country during 76 years:
José Rafael Carrera 1837-1865
Justo Rufino Barrios 1871-1885
Manuel Estrada Cabrera 1898-1920 and
Jorge Ubico 1931-1944.
Between 1944 and 1954 two democratically elected
governments headed by
Juan José Arévalo and Jacobo Arbenz respectively,
introduced fundamental changes at many levels of society.
Expropriation of lands belonging to the United Fruit Company put
the governments of Guatemala and the United States on a collision
course. In 1954, an invasion force organized by the Central
Intelligence Agency entered the country. The Army refused to
fight it off and soon thereafter, President Arbenz went into
exile never to return (Immerman 1982, Gleisejesses 1991). The
subsequent counterrevolutionary regime proceeded to roll back
many of the reformist measures of the previous decade. Civil and
political freedoms were repressed also. Between 1954 and 1985 all
but one of the governments were headed by military men. These
governments created and maintained a vacuum in the political
center by killing or forcing into exile, leaders not only of
left-wing groups and guerrilla sympathizers but of moderate
center-right parties, university professors, rural and urban
labor union organizers, teachers, business leaders, healthcare
workers, artists, intellectuals and Clergy along with anyone else
who might be perceived as an emerging civilian leader (Aguilera
Peralta 1980, Albizures 1980, Chomsky 1991, Frundt 1987, Levenson
1989).
From 1960 onwards, as leftist Guerrillas began to
mount a series of armed operations, the levels of
government-sponsored terrorism rose dramatically, culminating in
the scorched earth policies of the period 1980-1984 (Falla 1994,
Handy, 1992, Lebot, 1992, ). Numerous teachers were murdered as
part of this policy of extermination. The Army and paramilitary
groups targeted them as potential leaders or guerrilla
sympathizers (CEH, 1999). By 1990, the entire country was under
military control with military detachments and bases in 20 of the
country’s 22 Departments (Smith,1990). At the height of the
carnage, some 25 percent of the country’s population was
displaced and tens of thousands were killed or disappeared. In
areas where the policy of extermination of civilian populations
reached its logical conclusion, up to 80 percent of the
population was displaced. Ninety percent of the Human Rights
violations documented between 1960 and 1996 are directly
imputable to the Guatemalan State and its agents (army, police
and paramilitary Death Squads). Some 7% were committed by leftist
Guerrillas while the remainder 3% cannot be attributed to either
party (REMHI, 1998).
Despite relatively stable levels of economic
growth during the period 1950-1980, no long term re-investment
policies in education or health were developed. Thus,
socioeconomic prosperity remained confined to a small segment of
the population (Barry & Preusch 1986, CEPAL 1984, Demyck
1983). As early as 1978, a World Bank study had identified the
single most important factor in Guatemala’s weak
performance in several key economic and social indicators: The
lack of a well developed education system.
For example [...] Korea’s industrial investment during
the period 1965-1973 was only three times that of Guatemala, but
its industry provided employment to 965,000 people, fifteen times
more than did Guatemalan industry.
Critical to the success of Korea’s development strategy
was the highly developed education system which produced a
literate population able to acquire industrial skills quickly.
Guatemala’s education system needs to be upgraded markedly
if the country is to reduce unemployment through the development
of industry. In these fields Guatemala’s efforts are still
far from adequate (p. 16).
As Ibarra de Calix (1997) found twenty years
later, the educational system continues to be the Achiles Tendon
in all efforts to modernize the national economy:
Two of the factors which greatly reduce Guatemala’s
workforce competitiveness are the lack of skilled workers and the
low level of training among the general population. [...] Should
these trends continue in terms of quality and overall training
levels, the country will not be able to overcome its
underdevelopment thereby preempting society as a whole from
benefitting of the technological advances and transfer of new
technologies produced elsewhere. (p. 318). (Note 3)
The resulting cycle of underemployment and under
educational achievement has exacerbated the levels of
socioeconomic inequalities: Guatemala’s Income Distribution
disparities are the greatest in the Western Hemisphere second
only to Brazil’s (CEPAL, 1997).
The legislative framework
All citizens have a right and an obligation to receive
education at the Pre-Primary, Primary, Lower and Higher Secondary
levels within the age limits established by law. (Note 4)
Some laws are made by God and those are untouchable. Some laws
are made by men and those can be argued about. Then there are
laws made for Guatemalans. Them laws are like hot cinders; good
to keep the rich man’s house warm but never enough to bring
light to a poor man’s ranch. (Note 5)
The passing of legislation is a lengthy and
convoluted process with lots of procedural delays and wrangling
over the most minute drafting technicalities, the formal elements
of law clearly having precedence over their actual significance.
Hence, only those legislative items which top the presidential
agenda receive appropriate attention and are dealt with within a
reasonable time frame. Thus, it can take several months or even
years for those legislative items not pushed by the President to
be passed.
Educational regulations must undergo several
layers of legislative approvals before coming into force. The
first such layer is Congressional approval. According to
Guatemala’s legal system, all administrative changes and
policies enacted by government departments must be approved by
Congress. Such approval usually takes between two or three years
depending on the priority given to the changes by the Executive.
Because of these lengthy procedural delays, Ministries and
sometimes the quasi-ministerial agencies issue binding
regulations known as Acuerdos Ministeriales [Ministerial
Decrees]. The President can also issue binding regulations; in
this case they are known as [Acuerdos Gubernativos [Executive
Decrees]. All these types of regulatory acts have the same legal
force as laws passed by Congress. In addition, all of these
different types of Decrees are issued with or without
Congressional approval nor oversight thereof. Such parceling of
public policy results in a panoply of intricate and oftentimes
contradictory sets of regulations set up by different levels of
government
Since the restoration of democracy, most
governments have been headed by members of the same political
parties in both the Executive and Legislative branches. As a
result, all major educational policy initiatives are initiated by
the Executive. The inability to govern from a divided powers
perspective was illustrated during J. Serrano’s Presidency
in 1993, when antagonism between Congress and the Executive
resulted in an attempt by the Executive to abolish Congress and
to impose rule by decree, Caudillo style. The attempt to shut
down Congress failed and Serrano was forced to flee the country.
In short, educational policies are generally imposed on the
educational system top-down fashion with little or no input from
the affected parties. Once new legislation is approved, Congress
must then issue specific regulations which spell out in great
detail the scope and limitations of the acts that can be
performed under the new laws. Again, the passing of the specific
regulations can take a long time unless it is high on the
Executive’s agenda. As a result, although Guatemala had
several major educational reform initiatives over the last two
decades, the actual functioning of the Ministry of Education is
still governed by the regulations dating back to 1977. Therefore,
administrative and policy changes required to bring MINED’s
internal organization in line with the legislative changes passed
by Congress never took place (Galo de Lara, 1997).
To compensate for the absence of appropriate
regulations, a full panoply of ad-hoc Ministerial Decrees has
been enacted over the years. In addition, numerous Executive
Decrees have also been issued in an equally haphazard fashion and
with no apparent policy direction nor long term objectives.
Both of these deal with every conceivable action such as
setting up of new interministerial agencies, execution of
educational reforms, licences to operate private schools and even
to day-to-day administrative matters. Their exact number is
unknown. As of 1998 , there was no centralized legal database or
catalog of existing laws or newly approved ones.
It was estimated that some 15 thousand pieces of legislation
and other 30 thousand Decrees from different levels were neither
registered in a database nor properly catalogued (Larra, 1998).
These legal entanglements are partly responsible for the
considerable delays and institutional weaknesses noted in many
aspects of the internal operations at MINED.
Administrative processes in Guatemala’s
government
Administratively, the country is divided in 22
Departments and some 325 municipalities. Mayors are the only
locally elected authorities. They are elected to periods of two
to four years depending on the size of their municipality. In
addition, there are Departmental Governors who are directly
appointed by the Executive. Neither municipal authorities nor
Governors have any decision-making input in the educational
policy process at the national level. Rural areas participation
in national policy making processes is further constrained by the
legal and administrative operational definitions which date back
to 1938 and remain unchanged (United Nations, 1999).
The national government is organized in a myriad
of administrative units of varying size and competencies,
oftentimes with high degrees of duplication. At the top there are
the Ministers who are appointed by the Executive. These
individuals are almost always appointed to their positions as a
result of their loyalty to the President rather than by their
professional suitability for the post. Underneath the ministerial
echelons there are Deputy Ministers [Vice-Ministros in Spanish].
They are in charge of day to day operations of their departments.
Again, loyalty to the person who appointed them rather than
competency or the fulfilment of organizational priorities is the
main criterion for appointment to the position. This is a feature
of public administration in Pre-Modern States known as the
Loyalty Principle (Ruano, 1999). Simply stated, the Loyalty
Principle posits that regular bureaucratic channels which support
organizational control mechanisms, lines of accountability and
policy implementation are bypassed in favor of decision making
processes based almost entirely in the pre-eminence of personal
ties to the individual from whom appointees derive their power
base. In this type of Pre-Modern administrative arrangement,
people are not expected to work for the objectives of the
bureaucracy but for the person who appointed them (Ruano 1999 p.
2ff).
A third level of administration is composed by the
Directors General who oversee specific agencies within a
Ministry. Each Ministry has many agencies which operate in a
quasi-autonomous manner and are known as Direcciones Generales
[General Directorates].
These Directorates and Sub-Directorates have branches
throughout the nation where further atomization of public policy
has been identified by previous research (Dignard 1987,
Galvez-Borrel 1996, Dunkerley 1988, ). Other administrative
shortcomings observed include critical shortages of qualified
managers, high turnover, excessive duplication, inadequate
taxation rates and feeble fiscal accountability procedures, lack
of clear hiring and promotion criteria, nepotism, constant shifts
in administrative and public policy priorities, weak enforcement
capabilities and corruption (Brewer-Carias 1979, Clark 2000, El
Periodico 1998, Heyman 1995, Handy 1991, International Monetary
Fund 1995, United Nations 1998).
Other government agencies with quasi-ministerial
characteristics include the Taxation Administration Authority,
the Judiciary, National Housing Administration and dozens of
others.
All ministries follow a similar organizational
pattern except the Ministry of Defense which has its own internal
arrangements and for all practical purposes is only accountable
to the military High Command (Black 1985, Goldman 1999,
McClintock 1985, Nairns & Simon 1986 Ruano 1997). (Note 6) Furthermore,
within this organizational pattern, numerous instances of Loose
Coupling (Churchill et al.1979, Gamoran & Dreben 1986) are
observed. That is to say, patterns of administrative behavior
whereby managers and employees are mostly concerned with the
operational survival of the units under their control rather than
the overall functioning of the Civil Service. This results in
further diffusion of lines of accountability at all levels of the
government. The specific consequences of these regulatory
arrangements for the implementation of bilingual curricula in
private schools are also analyzed in this research.
MINED’s structure and role in the
education system
The defining characteristics of the education sector are
inequity,
low coverage and low quality (Note 7) .
In principle, the Ministry of Education or MINED
is responsible for educational policy, including planning and
coordination as well as curriculum design and quality assurance
for both public and private education. MINED supervises all
levels of instruction [kindergarten, primary, lower and higher
secondary] except Higher Education which is self governing due to
Constitutional Mandates which grant Self-Government or
Autonomía Universitaria to the University. MINED is
Guatemala’s largest government department in terms of its
number of employees, overtaking Defense and Public Health
Ministries. Following the organizational pattern found elsewhere
in the Guatemalan government, MINED is composed of a myriad of
Departments, General Directorates and autonomous units all of
them functioning with high degrees of loose-coupling. According
to a World Bank study (1995), some 1,400 agencies, units or
departments were found to be under the nominal control of MINED.
Many of these units had been created to oversee specific projects
or multilateral agreements and continued to exist long after
their original purpose had ceased to exist. Between 1980 and
1990, the number of teachers remained unchanged while
administrative personnel increased by 15 percent (UNESCO,
1991).
At the same time, other Ministries such as Agriculture, Health
and Defense maintain educational facilities of their own and, in
the case of Defense, they are in charge of training for large
numbers of conscripted soldiers in non-military occupations
inside military installations. All these expenditures and
resources deployed are outside the control of MINED or its
oversight.
There is also a large number of Spanish language schools which
cater to foreigners. These schools are under the control of the
Guatemalan Institute of Tourism which issues licences
authorizing the functioning of such facilities.
There is a sharp division of tasks between
MINED’s administrative employees and teachers. The latter
have little or no input in any administrative and procedural
matters nor is their input sought when drafting educational
reform initiatives which are always prepared by administrative
personnel with the assistance of international agencies or
consultants.
Moreover, duplication and compartmentalization of the simplest
tasks can reach extraordinary proportions, forcing even the
simplest administrative decisions to go through a number of steps
and procedures. For instance, it takes up to two years after
graduation for a student to receive her post-high school or
vocational track graduation diploma, such is the number of
signatures and approvals required. As no clear lines of authority
are defined, and given the patron-client relations established
between different individuals within MINED, diffuse
decision-making is constantly exercised. In practice this means
that nobody can or wants to assume responsibility for anything
that is not clearly outlined in a legal procedure. Simple
decisions take months to be made -if at all. Many of these
individuals report directly to the Minister who is perceived as
the final decision-maker. This perception is not groundless; he
or someone acting on his authority is required to sign and
approve every single appointment and promotion at all levels.
These micro management traits result in lower level employees
fearing for reprisals from their superiors should the approval of
the latter not be obtained before making a decision however
simple it may be. These restrictive practices result on reduced
level of institutional accountability while increasing the
isolation between MINED’s agencies. Passive resistance
becomes the behavior of choice for those whose livelihood depends
on the existence of their unit in isolation from all the others.
As one MINED employee put it, "I can feed the Minister three
kinds of information: false information, misleading information
and the truth. None can force me to give him what he wants." All
these characteristics tend to reinforce the public’s
perception of MINED as a non-responsive, closed institution with
little or no regard for their concerns.
Hierarchically speaking, MINED is essentially a
top-down structure consisting of four strata. At the top level we
find the Minister and about ten or so associates who are
recruited by him on the basis of loyalty and -only secondarily-
ability. Some of these individuals are not classified as regular
civil service personnel. Instead, they are known as Advisors
(Asesores) to the Minister while others are appointed as
technical and administrative Deputy Ministers.
This group advises and shapes the general orientation of the
Ministry in accordance with the Minister's priorities. Those at
the top level regard all levels below them as unmanageable dead
weight "unless you work with a group of like-minded technocrats
or bring in your own people from outside, it is very hard to get
anything done at MINED" (Galo de Lara, personal communication).
The interests of the top echelon are fully political, tied as
they are to the fortunes of the Minister who brought them on
board. Their time in office is unpredictable, ranging from a few
months to four years as all new Ministers bring in their own
group of advisors and no government carries on the educational
policies of previous ones.
Below the Minister and Deputy-Minister levels, all
Departments are staffed by civil servants. The third level is
occupied by the Directors General at the national level. As a
result of administrative regionalization in the mid-1980's,
further departmental directorships were created. There are some
twenty units headed by a Director General. The units in charge of
primary and secondary/vocational education are the
Dirección general de educación primaria and the
Dirección general de educación media
respectively.
The fourth level in the administrative chain is
the Supervisor. They are the only operational link between
private schools and the MINED bureaucracy. In 1999, there were
some 55 supervisors in charge of overseeing all of the elementary
and secondary schools in Guatemala City. (Note 8) The figure given in the text
was compiled by the author from interviews during fieldwork
throughout Guatemala City.. Their main task is to enforce
ministerial policies and regulations at the school level for they
constitute the only direct link between MINED and school
principals in the private and public schools. Each supervisor is
in charge of a school district (distrito escolar) which is
simply a group of schools treated as a unit due to geographical
proximity. There are approximately 93 districts in Guatemala
City. The number of schools within each district varies widely
depending on its size, some covering 30 schools while others
covering 50 or more. Supervisors are usually former school
teachers with no additional pedagogical nor administrative
training and whose oversight functions entail large amounts of
time spent on revising paperwork submitted by the schools under
their charge. Those individuals who are promoted to the
Supervisor’s position receive no salary increases nor any
other type of incentives to further their professionalization.
Over the last three decades few if any training programs or
mechanisms specifically aimed at improving the long-term
performance and/or qualifications of Supervisors' have been set
up by MINED. MINED does not allocate any additional resources to
carry out the supervisor's duties. As a result, in many areas of
the country, it is common for private schools to contribute with
some of his/her expenses, for instance, office space, stationary
supplies and clerical support. Several school districts hire
secretarial help and donate office space for supervisors. In
other instances, such support extended to "salary supplements".
In a chronically underfunded Ministry, this is hardly surprising.
Even less so, given the regularity of complaints from teachers
about late or no payment of their salaries (Siglo XXI, 1999).
Theoretically, the Directorates of Primary and
Secondary Education oversee all private schools. In practice,
however, not even the Directors General of the Primary and of the
Secondary Divisions can agree on a common agenda to harmonize
those aspects of the policy process which affect both these
divisions even though all supervisors in Guatemala City are
required to oversee both primary and secondary schools within
their individual districts. Thus, it is not uncommon to find
children and teachers without schools; schools unable to have
facilities of their own, while empty buildings await those who
were supposed to occupy them; empty installations bereft of basic
equipment or textbooks and poorly trained personnel; these are
some of the consequences of MINED's organizational configuration
which were identified by a UNESCO study in 1980. Sixteen years
later, another study (Ruano de Flores, 1997) found that the
problems identified in 1980 had become even worse. The most
recent manifestation of this administrative inconsistency took
place during the failed attempt to incorporate students from the
senior year in vocational career tracks into the national
literacy campaign. The campaign was coordinated not through MINED
but through the National Directorate for Literacy and the
Presidential Secretariat for Social Affairs, an office
traditionally used as an executive branch outlet to give
visibility to the President’s wife through charity
projects. Needless to say, the decision to incorporate the
students had been taken without consulting schools, parents nor
the students concerned. As word began to spread out that students
would be required to give up part or all of their senior year of
studies to participate in the literacy campaign, widespread
protests erupted throughout Guatemala. In the resulting fiasco,
the government was forced to back down and had to redefine the
entire scope of the literacy campaign (Prensa Libre, 2001).
Lastly, MINED has very limited research and
development capabilities. MINED does not foster any long term
cooperation initiatives between public and private schools at
either the Departmental or National level. Research comparing
curricular, administrative or financial aspects of private and
public education in Guatemala is virtually non-existent (Ruano,
2002). There are no formal mechanisms to allow private and public
schools to exchange information on best practices, sharing of
facilities such as libraries, information technology or teacher
professional development programs.
Researching Education in Guatemala: Fieldwork,
methodological and sampling issues
The majority of fieldwork was undertaken between
1997 and 1999 as part of a Doctoral Dissertation. Subsequent
observations and follow up interviews took place in 2001 through
a University Research Grant. Some of the schools observed follow
the standard Guatemalan Academic Calendar from January through
October while others use the North American one from September
through June. While the original fieldwork included observations,
interviews and statistical analysis of some 40 private and public
schools throughout the City, the findings presented here are
based on work carried out in six private establishments which
shared similar characteristics as follows:
Between 700 and 1000 students total enrolment more or less
evenly divided between Primary and Secondary Divisions (between 7
and 17 years old).
Fully Bilingual Curriculum from first grade Elementary to
Senior year Secondary where English is the Second Language taught
and Spanish the primary one.
Total financial autonomy from public funding sources. Fully
funded from student fees and other types of private
contributions.
Fully self-governing through a Board of Trustees or as a
family run and owned institution.
Non denominational.
During fieldwork preliminary open ended
questionnaires were administered to both teaching and
administrative staff in order to get baseline data on teaching
assignments, administrative tasks and student performance
indicators. Further data was obtained through focus groups with
parents, students and administrative and ancillary staff. Data on
Governance arrangements was obtained via interviews with key
decision makers in the schools. Documentary cross checking was
carried out through examination of schools records, Ministry of
Education documentation (when available) and related materials.
Nevertheless, the research effort faced clear and at times severe
restrictions. Some of the most important involve categorical
refusals on the part of most schools to go on record as to
financial and governance aspects. Not a single school from which
data was obtained in this study would allow its name or the
identities of its Officials to be named. Only exceptionally was
the researcher allowed to make copies of school records. With
rare exceptions no interviews were taped and no participants in
focus groups or individual interviews could be named or implied
if such implication could lead to their identification. Other
restrictions involved agreements made between the researcher and
the schools so as to prevent sharing of Curricular and
pedagogical practices with other schools.
Some of the arguments given by school officials
regarding the restrictions imposed are related to security
concerns; Guatemala City is regarded as one of the most violent
regions in the world (World Bank 1997, Buvinic, Morrison, &
Shifter 1999) sharing top murder and kidnaping rankings in a list
where one can find cities such as Bogota (Colombia), San Salvador
(El Salvador) and Johannesburg (South Africa). Evidently, some of
the students enrolled in these schools are prime targets for
extortion and kidnapping and their security becomes a basic
concern at the schools they attend. Other rationales given are
related to economic considerations, as in the case of
restrictions imposed on the sharing of Curricular and pedagogical
practices with other schools. Such practices are regarded as
“trade secrets” by the schools. Hence their
reluctance to have those practices known by other schools
regarded as competitors in a market segment that is very small
due to the extreme socioeconomic stratification noted previously.
Based on these limitations, the data and analysis thereof is
presented in a composite-type fashion from which an overall
picture emerges. That is to say, the data is integrated into a
general framework from which analytical categories can be
discerned and conclusions drawn. For instance, rather than
focusing on specific financial or governance arrangements of
individual schools, an overall analysis is presented.
Lastly, where it is necessary to refer to the
larger context of private education in Guatemala, the analysis
presented is based on the baseline data obtained throughout
fieldwork. Due to the scarcity of previous research in this area,
much of the data was generated and is presented in a systematic
fashion for the first time.
Private bilingual education: organizational and governance
aspects
Look, what do you think this is? An American Indian
Reservation or something? Our students’ parents want their
kids to learn English, not Mayan languages. (Note 9)
In terms of ownership arrangements, elite
bilingual private schools in Guatemala City can be divided in
three large categories. First there are those who are run as
family businesses by members of a family. In this model, certain
administrative tasks are delegated to a Principal or School
Coordinator while the owners retain overall control in all other
aspects including, textbook selection, hiring and firing of
teachers, performance assessments, academic and other fees
charged to students as well overall curricular orientation.
Members of the owning family usually hold positions such as
teachers, counselors, librarians or accountants for the
school.
The second category is made up of establishments
that are run by a Board of Governors (Consejo Directivo). This
board is usually made up of parents and other individuals who
have contributed financially to the setting up of the school and
can in fact be construed as shareholders with overall control of
the school’s activities. Usually, the board hires a
Principal and other administrative staff upon whom many of the
day to day functions are delegated.
The third category is made up of those schools
which are controlled by religious or denominational entities.
Historically, the majority of denominational schools are from
Evangelical and Catholic denominations (Rose & Brouwer,
1990). In recent years, the Church of Latter Day Saints or
Mormons has set up schooling facilities for its members
throughout Guatemala. In the case of Church owned establishments,
overall control is retained by the religious entity with limited
or no input from non-Church participants. All of the schools
where data collection took place for this study where
non-denominational. As a general rule, denominational schools are
quite difficult to gain access to due to a number of factors such
as mistrust towards outside researchers, lack of interest in
educational practices not approved by their superiors and an
overall climate of defensiveness on the part of school officials.
A very small segment of the privately run schools is made up of
so-called bi-national schools. These were set up by German,
French and United States immigrants and expatriates resident in
Guatemala.
The binational schools tend to follow the curricular
arrangements of the countries they are associated with, granting
exit diplomas comparable to those of schools in the home country.
Their clientele is made up of wealthy Guatemalan families
children of expatriate workers and descendants of
immigrants.
In terms of organizational arrangements there is
also variability. While the establishments dealt with in this
study have a multi-layered organizational pattern composed of
teachers, principals and administrative support staff, the vast
majority of private schools have a simple structure comprised of
teachers and a principal who can also be the school's owner.
Affordable private education usually consists "of large numbers
of students crammed into matchbox-sized classrooms with school
facilities and teachers not worthy of the name" (Fernández
García, 1998, p. 4). A standard private school is usually
a reconditioned home with a small courtyard and few -if any-
pedagogical aids. It must be remembered that, with limited public
investment in education in previous decades, demographic pressure
forced many lower-income families to enrol their children in
these private institutions which were the only ones they could
afford and are still preferable -in their view- to many public
schools (Galindo, Personal communication).
Supervision of private schools takes place on
paper only. This means that they are required to present large
amounts of forms and documentation attesting to the schools'
program content, teaching staff and facilities. Nevertheless,
supervisors will seldom visit a school to verify the validity of
the claims made. Once a school is registered its licence to
operate is granted through a Ministerial Decree in some
instances while other schools are authorized under an Executive
Decree. It is unclear why some establishments were authorized to
operate under different types of Decrees. Nevertheless, such
licenses must be re-validated on an annual basis.
This means that Supervisors spend a great amount of time
dealing with the paperwork generated by private schools when
renewing their licenses.
Curricular organization and teaching
aspects
In terms of Curriculum formulation, the Education
Law requires a threshold of compliance with the basic curricula
which is comprised of Mathematics, Spanish Language, Social
Studies and Biology whenever they are taught in Spanish. Any
other activities, subjects and programs of study delivered beyond
the basic curricula and delivered in languages other than Spanish
are considered to be optional and are neither subject to
administrative nor academic oversight. Overall compliance with
the basic curricula is enforced by MINED supervisors. As has been
noted earlier in this section, Supervisors have very limited
enforcement capabilities to bear upon the very institutions which
oftentimes supply them with basic office equipment and
“salary supplements”. As a result there is virtually
no way of enforcing compliance with basic curricular content.
Furthermore, private schools are at complete liberty to set up
their own admissions standards which can include entrance
examinations, financial screening and personal interviews with
both parents and prospective students. Results of examinations
are never made public and there is no mechanism to compare
performance across schools. There are no nation-wide standardized
tests, process indicators nor any other recognized input or
output indicators used with enough consistency to allow for
proper assessments of the private education sector to be carried
out. This is an institutional weakness which is present in
various degrees throughout Latin America (Birdsall & Sabot
1996, Dignard 1986, Lowden 1996, Otis 1997, Savedoff 1998, Silva
1996, Vos 1996).
Generally speaking, Private institutions have an
almost unlimited discretion in curriculum design and teachable
subjects so long as schools claim that part or all of their
instruction takes place in a foreign language. For example,
almost all private schools claim to offer one or more bilingual
-mostly English/Spanish- vocational tracks. Because English is
considered to be an additional subject it is usually off limits
to ministerial oversight. Thus, most private schools'
advertisements profess to be "fully bilingual" meaning
English-Spanish. In relation to the establishments analyzed for
this study, the preferred approach is to set up a situation of
parallel bilingualism whereby a certain number of subjects is
taught entirely in English alongside their Spanish counterparts.
The main curricular and governance consequence of such
arrangement is that a school is effectively split in two separate
areas along linguistic lines. Thus, there is a Principal in
charge of the English language segment while another runs the
Spanish one. Little or no coordination was observed to exist
between both segments.
Hiring and firing of teachers takes place at the
discretion of the school’s owner with no right to appeal by
the teacher. None of the schools researched by the author
throughout Guatemala City have seniority nor tenure provisions
for their teaching staff. Thus, teaching salaries remain stagnant
or accrue only small increases over the span of many years of
service. Retirement plans or Pension Funds for private school
teachers are virtually unheard of. There are no legal avenues to
counter these arbitrary practices as the working conditions and
contracts set forth by private schools are not regulated by MINED
but by the Ministry of Labor. There is no professional
organization to represent private school teachers nationwide and
no initiatives to improve their professional standing and working
conditions have ever been undertaken by MINED or other
stakeholders.
Working conditions for most teachers are
difficult. As salaries are low, it is not unusual to find
teachers who work in two or even three different jobs to make
ends meet. This is a critical factor behind low teaching
standards and poor student performance. It is also a phenomenon
found in many developing countries (Farrell & Oliveira,
1993). Even the elite bilingual schools studied spend little or
no resources for professional development. Not a single private
school visited during fieldwork offers financial incentives or
time off support for teachers who wish to further their training
at the university level. Similarly to their public sector
counterparts, private school teachers need no additional training
nor credentials to become principals at either the Primary or
Secondary level (AMEU 1998, Fadul 1997). Likewise, pay scales,
in-service training and additional support mechanisms for
teachers are left entirely at the discretion of the
establishment’s owner whose ultimate decision-making
authority is never questioned. As pointed out previously, school
owners are rarely qualified school administrators. “My
father gave me my Colegio as a wedding present” said
the owner of a school interviewed by the author. During
fieldwork, this author observed how principals almost invariably
deferred to the establishments' owners opinion even in areas
which were clearly Curricular in nature.
Financing the autonomy of private
schools
Due to constantly increasing demand for
educational services, private schools became an important
provider of educational facilities. According to article 73 of
the Constitution, all private educational establishments are
exempt from payment of all taxes on all their activities. This
exemption extends to school supplies and materials, tuition fees
and ancillary fees as well as to infrastructure. In the case of
schools looked at in this study the range of fees varies between
three and five-thousand dollars a year. Thus, total tax
exemptions amount to millions of dollars. It is important to
point out that private schools receive no direct funding from the
government. Therefore, each of them must meet its financial needs
through registration and ancillary fees charged directly to
students. There is no publicly funded system to support
attendance of children from lower income background whose parents
wish them to attend private schools
Demographic pressures during the 1970's and 1980's
coupled with declining government investment in the construction
of new schools created an ever increasing demand for
privately-run facilities. The growth in private education has not
been matched by national regulations on the quality and type of
instruction offered. As a result, schools tend to focus more on
their economic viability rather than their academic performance.
This is true of the vast majority of establishments and probably
more so of the elite bilingual schools whose only claim to
superior academic standards lies in the prestige levels they
project to society. In other words, brand name recognition
reinforced by perceptions of economic success of the families of
attending students have more weight in a decision to choose a
school over their competitors. Many parents in focus groups were
particularly explicit on their motivations in selecting
individual establishments. In the families researched in this
study, such selection is usually made by the mother as opposed to
the father. Among the rationales given one can find:
“That’s where I went to school, therefore,
that’s where my children will go.”
“I heard from other mothers that this school has a good
reputation.”
“I know the Principal of this school. She’s very
good.”
“The school is in the neighborhood. You know, one less
security risk to be worried about.”
“I want my children to learn good English and math. This
school is one of the best in preparing kids to go to universities
in the United States and succeeding in those academic
environments.”
“Most of the families of my children’s friends
have sent their kids here. It’s a way of keeping things in
the family so to speak.”
To a certain extent, attendance at these elite
establishments reinforces and reproduces the social networks
which are necessary to maintain one’s own position in the
social hierarchy. In a social environment such as
Guatemala’s where socioeconomic advancement prospects are
conditioned by the Loyalty Principle rather than by individual
talent, educational criteria take a back seat to socioeconomic
status considerations. It is not surprising then that, with some
exceptions, most parents did not seem to be interested in having
nationwide educational standards that could allow them to
compare schools based on clear performance indicators.
“We know just which schools would come on top of any
classification anyhow. So, no, I don’t see a need to
classify them” said a confident upper class parent when
asked about educational standards. While it can be argued that
subsidizing private education via tax exemptions is necessary and
even desirable in light of the large coverage and quality
deficits extant throughout the country, it can also be argued
that some or all of these deficits would not have arisen had the
government been able to generate enough revenue via general
taxation revenues to finance the quantity and quality of
additional public schools. Guatemala's overall tax collection
rates are among the lowest in the Americas (World Bank, 1995).
Moreover, a great deal of resources was spent for military
purposes particularly during the period 1980-1995. The resulting
diversion of resources away from educational activities have
turned MINED into a chronically underfunded Ministry with no hope
of reversing this trend in the foreseeable future. Five years
after the end of Civil War, Military expenditure still consumes
substantial portions of the country’s budget.
In addition to tax breaks, private schools obtain
substantial revenues from several activities. The most widely
used are:
- Entrance examinations (Exámenes de
admisión)
- School supplies lists (Listas de útiles
escolares)
- Registration bonuses
- Fundraising events.
These sources of income will be discussed in turn.
Entrance
examinations.
The majority of private schools conduct entrance
examinations at the beginning of the school year. These tests are
not standardized or regulated by MINED in any way. As is the case
in most private school decisions, the criteria used for grading
these tests are not made public nor are their results subject to
appeal. Essentially, each school decides what it is going to test
and how much students must pay to sit the examinations. In
practice, entrance examinations fees operate as a preliminary
financial screening device for parents: if they cannot afford to
pay the entrance examinations fees to begin with, then their
children are not suitable for attendance at that school. Usually,
the higher the cost of school fees, the higher the cost of the
entrance examinations. The examination itself is used as a
negative selection device in that it reflects the school’s
own curricular standards thereby preempting access by students
who were not exposed to such prior knowledge.
School supplies
lists.
At the beginning of the school year, each private
school decides which school supplies are to be purchased by the
students. Most of those supplies can only be found at the school
store or from suppliers approved by it. Each student is expected
to follow the lists' requirements to the letter. Lists are
outrageously detailed and are viewed by both parents and teachers
as an outward sign of the school's academic standard. In most
cases, schools buy new textbooks and other materials and lease
them to students during the school year. The same materials are
leased for several years. Through such leasing schemes, the
school recuperates the costs of materials several times over.
Periodically, MINED threatens to impose fines and other sanctions
on schools whose lists are deemed utterly extravagant in
pedagogical and financial terms. Nevertheless, it appears that no
such action has ever been taken.
Registration bonuses.
Registration bonuses are set amounts which parents
are required to pay upon first registration of their children. A
number of justifications are given for this charge, among them,
infrastructure expansion, decreased enrollments, increased
enrollments or some other unexpected contingency. It is worth
noting that teachers' salary increases is not among the reasons
for requesting these bonuses. The amount payable appears to be
completely arbitrary and to depend exclusively on the schools'
authorities. One parent described the bonus as a "dowry payment
we make so that the school will find my child acceptable, so to
speak." Under the current legal framework parents have very
limited ability to challenge decisions made by private
schools.
Fundraising events.
Fund-raising events are activities
organized by schools to generate income for a variety of reasons.
Again, they are decided upon by the school with little or no
input from parents. Many schools simply ask of students a certain
amount for "Fundraising activities" for the school year, in
addition to the bonuses discussed previously. Since few if any
private schools release yearly financial reports, it is
impossible to know the actual destination of these and any other
"contributions" demanded from students.
Concluding remarks
Research to understand the differential impact of
educational policy and curriculum formulation in private
institutions in Guatemala is at best very limited. There are
neither formal nor institutional mechanisms to allow private and
public schools to exchange information on best practices, sharing
of facilities such as libraries, information technology or staff
development programs. No initiatives to promote cooperation
between the two sectors have been implemented. Despite their
stated goal of focusing on quality and the improvement of
academic standards, no comparative assessments between private
schools exist. Thus, parents have no way of comparing test
scores, repetitions and dropout rates or costs per student across
establishments. Rodolfo Bianchi, former President of the
Association of Private Schools could not offer an explanation as
to why such comparisons were unavailable (Personal
communication).
In the absence of any common guidelines for quality
assessment, national standardized testing procedures and teaching
performance indicators, ability to pay becomes the only criteria
separating the different types of private schools. A school's
perceived quality is thus inextricably linked to its costs.
Ability to pay as the sole criterion to measure for quality also
results in academic tracking systems which mirror those of
society at large. Only those children from higher income families
can afford to attend the same schools attended by their
parents.
The rest of the student population must rely on the assurances
of each individual school as to its educational standards.
Bilingualism in the elite schools is regarded by
all parties concerned as primarily the attainment of English
language skills at a level which meets parental expectations of
social mobility or the preservation of social standing. Other
languages, particularly Indigenous ones, need not apply. There is
no discussion of the role played by Maya, Xinca or Garifuna
languages in the educational reality of the country (Ruano 2001,
AVANCSO 1998). Thus, Guatemalan elite bilingual schools tend to
reflect the different realities Guatemalans are forced to live
in. On the one hand a world of entrenched privilege and
dependency on foreign markets which make the survival of
exclusionary sociopolitical arrangements possible. On the other,
a world of great destitution and inequality which is also endowed
with great cultural diversity and resilience.
In terms of financial arrangements, private
schools are exempt from all taxation duties. Furthermore,
creative accounting practices and other devices insure that
financial records remain virtually immune to government scrutiny.
At the same time, no private institution in Guatemala City
receives direct funding from the government and there is no
system to support attendance of children from lower income
backgrounds whose parents wish them to attend private
schools. In addition, many institutions raise funds through
different measures such as obligatory purchases of school
uniforms, exorbitant graduation fees, entrance examination
payments and ancillary fees. Others purchase textbooks which they
then rent out to students for several years at handsome margins.
Still others require students to pay hefty entrance fees, the
so-called Bonuses (bonos in Spanish). Few if any higher income
schools have ever been charged under the provisions of the
education law for these abuses (Vásquez, 1998). Though not
justifiable, these measures are partly the result of the
extremely low priority accorded to education by the Guatemalan
government. In the ensuing climate of survival of the financially
fittest, private schools have little choice but to make use of
such practices.
As for the formulation and implementation of
curricula, the lack of clear administrative and legal guidelines
allows private schools to decouple themselves from most decision
making and policy-formulation processes emanating from the
government. For purely ideological reasons, (private schools'
perceived conservatism and pro-business stance, attendance by
higher social strata, differential fees charged), the Guatemalan
government simply assumes that private schools are of better
quality than public ones. This insures little scrutiny from both
MINED's authorities and the public at large. This perception is
also shared by all major international development agencies who
usually do not include the private sector initiatives in their
overall designs of educational reform packages. Few explanations
are offered as to why private schools should neither participate
nor be asked for their input in the educational policy process.
This exclusion from the policy process is very difficult to
understand given that there are five times more private schools
than public ones serving the 12-17 age group and that virtually
all pre-primary establishments are private (Rodas Martini,
1998).
For almost 40 years, Guatemalans were engaged in a
brutal Civil War that essentially originated in the socioeconomic
chasm which separates the haves from the have nots. After decades
of military stalemate, the conflict ended in 1996, nevertheless,
without resolving the outstanding social, economic and political
issues which originated it in the first place. With the war over,
Guatemalans must now decide whether to pursue social change
through the avenues of the democratic electoral process and
through increased participation in the national life. In this
sense, true and meaningful educational reform is one of the key
instruments in the attainment of a more equitable and prosperous
outlook for future generations.
Whether Guatemalans are prepared to leave behind
the disheartening premises of the present educational system and
replace them with alternatives that hold more promise for the
future is a question only time can answer.
Notes
1.
Press Editorial in Diario el Gráfico newspaper (1977)
by widely respected journalist and center right politician Jorge
Carpio Nicolle. Mr. Carpio Nicolle was murdered in 1993. His
assassination bore all the hallmarks of Army Death Squads
operations. To this day, the identity of his killers remains
unknown.
2.
Former Guatemalan Defense Minister General Hector Gramajo quoted
in NACLA Report on the Americas (July, 1995). Vol XXV:
p.2.
3. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are
the author’s responsibility.
4.
Article 74th of Guatemala’s Constitution.
5.
Remarks made by a rural teacher in the Eastern Department of
Chiquimula on Guatemala’s Constitutional provisions which
make attendance to school compulsory for all children aged
7-17.
6. The
Guatemalan Army’s obsession with social control and
political repression is still a central element to understand the
current socioeconomic outlook. Several years after the end of the
Civil War the Army’s network of political terrorism headed
by the nefarious Military Intelligence Services or G-2, along
with several other agencies, remains remarkably intact.
7. World
Bank: (1995). Guatemala, basic education strategy: equity and
efficiency in education. Latin America and the Caribbean
regional office report No. 13304-GU. Washington, DC: Author,
p. I.
8. Even
the exact number of supervisors is not clear. MINED's
comptroller' office gave a total of 58, while the Supervisor's
office said there were 50 with the rest being retained as
auxiliaries or for some unspecified reason.
9.
Remarks made by a Vice-Principal during an interview with the
author in Guatemala City during fieldwork in 1999.
Personal Communications:
Interviews with Mr. R. Bianchi and Ms. L. Galindo, former
President of the Association of Private Schools and School
Principal, respectively. Both interviews took place during
fieldwork in Guatemala (1998-2001). M.C. Galo de Lara, former
Deputy Minister of Education also provided the author with much
useful information on the organization of MINED.
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About the Author
Carlos R. Ruano
El Bosque University
Bogota, Colombia
Email: plaza.ruano@utoronto.ca
carlruano@yahoo.ca
Carlos R. Ruano is Senior Education Specialist, Americas
Branch with the Canadian International Development Agency
CIDA-ACDI in Hull, Canada. He is also Associate Professor of
Educational Foundations at El Bosque University in Bogota,
Colombia. He obtained B.A. degrees in Linguistics and History
from the University of Ottawa as well as an M.Sc from Georgia
State University and Doctor of Education from the University of
Toronto. Dr. Ruano's interests deal with the formulation and
implementation of educational policy in multicultural and
multilingual societies from a comparative and international
perspective. The views expressed in this article do not
necessarily represent those of CIDA-ACDI.
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