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Re-analysis of NAEP Math and Reading Scores in States with and without High-stakes Tests: Response to Rosenshine Audrey Amrein-Beardsley David C. Berliner Arizona State University Citation: Amrein-Beardsley, A. A. & Berliner, D. C. (2003, August 4). Re-analysis of NAEP math and reading scores in states with and without high-stakes tests: Response to Rosenshine. Education Policy Analysis Archives, 11(25). Retrieved [Date] from http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v11n25/. Abstract Here we address the criticism of our NAEP analyses by Rosenshine (2003). On the basis of his thoughtful critique we redid some of the analyses on which he focused. Our findings contradict his. This is no fault of his, the reasons for which are explained in this paper. Our findings do support our position that high-stakes tests do not do much to improve academic achievement. The extent to which states with high-stakes tests outperform states without high-stakes tests is, at best, indeterminable. Using 1994-1998 NAEP reading and 1996-2000 NAEP math data and accounting for NAEP exemption rates for the same years, we found that states with high-stakes tests are not outperforming states without high-stakes tests in reading in the 4th grade or math in the 8th grade at a statistically significant level. States with high-stakes tests are, however, outperforming states without high-stakes tests in math in the 4th grade at a statistically significant level. Our findings also support our earlier stance that states with high-stakes tests are exempting more students from participating in the NAEP than are states without high-stakes tests. This is more prevalent the more recent the NAEP test administration. This is illustrated in the tables below. Introduction In our research, we were concerned that scores on high-stakes state tests could easily be manipulated through narrowing of the curriculum, drilling on items similar to the test, increasing exclusion rates of students, increasing in dropouts and push-outs, and the like. To judge whether that concern was valid, we looked at audit tests—tests that might have some overlap with a state’s own test but where school personnel were under much less intense pressure to achieve higher scores. We chose a series of audit tests to examine—SAT, ACT and AP tests, as well as all administrations of the NAEP reading and mathematics tests. We also studied whether some unanticipated side effects were present when high-stakes tests were introduced, such as increased GED taking, increased reporting of cheating, problems of teacher morale, problems with student motivation to learn, and so forth. Substantive criticism of our work, thus far, has been limited to the NAEP data we reported. To our knowledge, the other conclusions we reached have not yet been subject to the same kinds of thoughtful criticism. So for now, given the methods that we used for analyses, our findings in those other areas stand. We concluded that there was no systematic pattern of gains on SATs, ACTs or AP exams. That is, we found no evidence of transfer from the state tests to these other tests, tests that can be considered as audit measures. In addition, we found increased drop-out rates and decreased high school graduation rates, increased rates by which students participated in the GED program, and a host of troubling negative affects associated with high-stakes testing. Here we address the criticism of our NAEP analyses by Rosenshine (2003). On the basis of his thoughtful criticism, we redid some of the analyses on which he focused and now have a different view of the findings. What we found contradicts what we found in both of our earlier papers (Amrein & Berliner, 2002a; Amrein & Berliner 2002b) but the data analyzed below are for different years of data from those used in the earlier papers. Following the form of the analyses done by Rosenshine the data analyzed below are only for the years 1994-1998 for the NAEP reading test, and 1996-2000 for the NAEP mathematics tests. In addition, in our earlier work we used the national trend line as the contrast or control group for our analyses. In this analysis, we use the composite score for states without high-stakes tests as the control. In addition, our findings contradict the findings reported by Rosenshine. This is no fault of his. Rosenshine used our designation of clear and unclear states with and without high-stakes tests from the second of our two papers.[2] We communicated many times and approved the states he used in his analysis. Given more consideration, however, we noticed the distinctions we made between clear and unclear states was based on our overall findings which were based on all of the available NAEP data. In other words, Rosenshine analyzed the latest two NAEP administrations in reading and math using the distinctions we made between clear and unclear states when we used all of the available NAEP data, approximately 10 years of NAEP data per subject. To complicate things more, because we used the national trend line as our control group, our clear/unclear distinctions were also made factoring in the national average. Rosenshine did not do this which makes for differences in the findings. He used the states without high-stakes tests as the control. This makes for a better analysis and we have followed his lead here. In short, Rosenshine should not be faulted for his findings nor should he be considered wrong in what he did. He did a fine reanalysis of our NAEP examination given the information he had at that point, and here we are redoing his. NAEP Reading Grade 4 1994-1998 Taking Table 1 from Amrein & Berliner (2002b) and the states in which high stakes tests were implemented before 1994 and between 1994 and 1998, we re-ran our analyses, as Rosenshine did, using all states with high-stakes tests and, as the control group, all states without high-stakes tests for which NAEP data were available. What we found in regards to reading grade 4 achievement from 1994-1998 is as follows: Table 1 Fourth grade 1994-1998 NAEP reading scores (raw data). States without high-stakes tests: NAEP 1994 NAEP 1998 States with high-stakes tests: NAEP 1994 NAEP 1998 Arizona 206 207 Alabama 208 211 Arkansas 209 209 Kentucky 212 218 California 197 202 Louisiana 197 204 Colorado 213 222 Maryland 210 215 Connecticut 222 232 Michigan n/a 217 Delaware 206 212 Mississippi 202 204 Florida 205 207 Missouri 217 216 Georgia 207 210 New Mexico 205 206 Hawaii 201 200 North Carolina 214 217 Iowa 223 223 Oklahoma n/a 220 Kansas n/a 222 South Carolina 203 210 Maine 228 225 Tennessee 213 212 Massachusetts 223 225 Texas 212 217 Minnesota 218 222 West Virginia 213 216 Montana 222 226 Nevada n/a 208 New Hampshire 223 226 New York 212 216 Oregon n/a 214 Rhode Island 220 218 Utah 217 215 Virginia 213 218 Washington 213 217 Wisconsin 224 224 Change in Score Change in Score Wyoming 221 219 OVERALL 214.7 216.8 +2.1* OVERALL 208.8 213.1 +4.3* *Significant at a p < .05 level Table 1 illustrates that the states with high-stakes tests outperformed those states without high-stakes tests on the NAEP grade 4 reading tests over the period 1994-1998. However, as shown in our earlier research (Amrein & Berliner, 2002a; Amrein & Berliner, 2002b), the rates by which students are excluded from the NAEP must be taken into consideration to determine whether gains and losses are clear (interpretable) or unclear (not interpretable). Clear gains can be determined if a state’s scores increase while the rates by which students are exempted from the NAEP stay the same or decrease. In other words, when the pool of students sampled to participate in the NAEP is less selective then the likelihood that their scores would increase artificially is nullified. Under these conditions such gains are clear. Clear losses can be determined if a state’s scores decrease at the same time the rates by which students are exempted from the NAEP increase. In this case, the pool of students sampled was more selective and yet the scores still went down. Under these conditions it is reasonable to interpret those findings as a clear loss. Unclear gains are the case when a state’s scores increase while the rates by which students are exempted from the NAEP increase. In other words, the pool of students sampled to participate in the NAEP is more selective and therefore likely to have biased the resulting gains. If lower-scoring students are pulled from the NAEP sample, scores on the NAEP will increase. This makes for unclear results. Unclear losses are the case when a state’s scores decrease at the same time the rates by which students are exempted from the NAEP sample decrease. In this case, the pool of students sampled was less selective so it is difficult to determine whether the addition of more lower-scoring students or an actual decrease in achievement caused the resulting losses. We believe that it is absolutely necessary to make these kinds of judgments about each state because states with high-stakes tests are those states that increasingly are exempting more students from participating in the NAEP. “In states with high-stakes tests, between 0%–49% of the gains in NAEP scores can be explained by increases in rates of exclusion.” (Amrein & Berliner, 2002a) Looking simply at those states for which clear gains or losses are applicable, an analysis of the data yields the results given in Table 2. In this table states shaded in green are those for which clear results were evident, states shaded in red are those for which unclear results were illustrated, and states shaded in yellow are those for which there were not enough data to analyze gains or losses appropriately. As can be seen, only two states included in the states with high-stakes column can be counted as states with “clear” effects. The composite data are not significant but the table illustrates the extent to which states with high-stakes tests are not gaining in score simply because of their high-stakes testing policies. Table 2 Fourth grade 1994-1998 NAEP reading scores with states coded as clear or unclear in their gains and losses. States without high-stakes tests: NAEP 1994 NAEP 1998 States with high-stakes tests: NAEP 1994 NAEP 1998 Arizona 206 207 Alabama 208 211 Arkansas 209 209 Kentucky 212 218 California 197 202 Louisiana 197 204 Colorado 213 222 Maryland 210 215 Connecticut 222 232 Michigan n/a 217 Delaware 206 212 Mississippi 202 204 Florida 205 207 Missouri 217 216 Georgia 207 210 New Mexico 205 206 Hawaii 201 200 North Carolina 214 217 Iowa 223 223 Oklahoma n/a 220 Kansas n/a 222 South Carolina 203 210 Maine 228 225 Tennessee 213 212 Massachusetts 223 225 Texas 212 217 Minnesota 218 222 West Virginia 213 216 Montana 222 226 Nevada n/a 208 New Hampshire 223 226 New York 212 216 Oregon n/a 214 Rhode Island 220 218 Utah 217 215 Virginia 213 218 Washington 213 217 Wisconsin 224 224 Change in Score Change in Score Wyoming 221 219 OVERALL 215.4 217.0 +1.6* OVERALL 209.5 210.0 +0.5 *Significant at a p < .05 level The composite data are important in that they nullify what one might conclude looking simply at Table 1. States with high-stakes tests are not outperforming states without high-stakes tests in reading grade 4 performance. Rather, as illustrated in Table 2, states without high-stakes tests gained in reading grade 4 performance at a statistically significant level. Given only two states are included as clear states with high-stakes tests, states with high-stakes tests made insignificant gains and the differences between the two mean gains are not statistically significant. Most importantly, what can be drawn from Table 2 is that states with high-stakes tests are exempting more students from participating in the reading grade 4 NAEP. Ninety percent of the states with “unclear” gains are states with increases in the rates by which students were exempted from the test. This supports the notion that states with high-stakes tests are not gaining in NAEP scores simply because of their high-stakes testing policies. NAEP Math Grade 4 1996-2000 Taking Table 1 from Amrein & Berliner (2002b) and the states in which high stakes tests were implemented before 1996 and between 1996 and 2000, we re-ran our analyses using all states with high-stakes tests and, as the control group, all states without high-stakes tests for which NAEP data were available. What we found in regards to math grade 4 achievement from 1996-2000 is as follows: Table 3 Fourth grade 1996-2000 NAEP mathematics scores (raw data) States without high-stakes tests: NAEP 1996 NAEP 2000 States with high-stakes tests: NAEP 1996 NAEP 2000 Alaska 224 n/a Alabama 212 218 Arizona 218 219 California 209 214 Arkansas 216 217 Delaware 215 n/a Colorado 226 n/a Florida 216 n/a Connecticut 232 234 Indiana 229 234 Georgia 216 220 Kentucky 220 221 Hawaii 215 216 Louisiana 209 218 Idaho n/a 227 Maryland 220 222 Illinois n/a 225 Massachusetts 229 235 Iowa 229 233 Michigan 226 231 Kansas n/a 232 Mississippi 208 211 Maine 233 231 Missouri 225 229 Minnesota 232 235 Nevada 217 220 Montana 228 230 New Jersey 227 n/a Nebraska 228 226 New Mexico 214 214 North Dakota 231 231 New York 223 227 Oregon 224 227 North Carolina 224 232 Rhode Island 221 225 Ohio n/a 231 Tennessee 219 220 Oklahoma n/a 225 Utah 226 227 Pennsylvania 226 n/a Vermont 225 232 South Carolina 213 220 Washington 225 n/a Texas 229 233 Wisconsin 231 n/a Change in Score Virginia 222 230 Change in Score Wyoming 223 229 West Virginia 224 225 OVERALL 224.9 226.8 +1.9* OVERALL 219.9 224.5 +4.6* *Significant at a p < .05 level Table 3 illustrates that the states with high-stakes tests outperformed those states without high-stakes tests on the math NAEP grade 4 tests over the time period 1996-2000. However, as argued earlier, the rates by which students are excluded from the NAEP must be taken into consideration to determine whether gains and losses are clear or unclear. Using the same rules as outlined above to determine clear and unclear gains and losses, we looked at only those states for which clear gains or losses are relevant. (For 4th grade reading, Rosenshine included the following states: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Montana, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. There are notable differences in the states he included and the states we included that likely came from the fact that we drew our states directly out of Table 1 of the original document.) An analysis of the data yields the following: Table 4 Fourth grade 1996-2000 NAEP mathematics scores with states coded as clear or unclear in their gains and losses. States without high-stakes tests: NAEP 1996 NAEP 2000 States with high-stakes tests: NAEP 1996 NAEP 2000 Alaska 224 n/a Alabama 212 218 Arizona 218 219 California 209 214 Arkansas 216 217 Delaware 215 n/a Colorado 226 n/a Florida 216 n/a Connecticut 232 234 Indiana 229 234 Georgia 216 220 Kentucky 220 221 Hawaii 215 216 Louisiana 209 218 Idaho n/a 227 Maryland 220 222 Illinois n/a 225 Massachusetts 229 235 Iowa 229 233 Michigan 226 231 Kansas n/a 232 Mississippi 208 211 Maine 233 231 Missouri 225 229 Minnesota 232 235 Nevada 217 220 Montana 228 230 New Jersey 227 n/a Nebraska 228 226 New Mexico 214 214 North Dakota 231 231 New York 223 227 Oregon 224 227 North Carolina 224 232 Rhode Island 221 225 Ohio n/a 231 Tennessee 219 220 Oklahoma n/a 225 Utah 226 227 Pennsylvania 226 n/a Vermont 225 232 South Carolina 213 220 Washington 225 n/a Texas 229 233 Wisconsin 231 n/a Change in Score Virginia 222 230 Change in Score Wyoming 223 229 West Virginia 224 225 OVERALL 224.5 225.6 +1.1 OVERALL 210.4 215.0 +4.6* *Significant at a p < .05 level Compared to the reading data above, we now find the opposite when we look at the math grade 4 NAEP composite data. When states with clear effects are pulled out and analyzed, it is apparent that states with high-stakes tests are outperforming states without high-stakes tests at a statistically significant level. The scores posted by the clear states with high-stakes tests are significantly different than the scores posted by the clear states without high-stakes tests. Again, however, what can also be drawn from Table 4 is that states with high-stakes tests are exempting more students from participating in the math grade 4 NAEP. Two times as many states with high-stakes tests exempted students and realized gains in grade 4 math achievement from 1996-2000 than did states without high-stakes tests. This, again, supports the notion that states with high-stakes tests are not all gaining in NAEP scores simply because of their high-stakes testing policies. NAEP Math Grade 8 1996-2000 Taking Table 1 from Amrein & Berliner (2002b) and the states in which high stakes tests were implemented before 1996 and between 1996 and 2000, we re-ran our analyses using all states with high-stakes tests and, as the control group, all states without high-stakes tests for which NAEP data were available. What we found in regards to math grade 8 achievement from 1996-2000 is as follows: Table 5 Eighth grade 1996-2000 NAEP mathematics scores (raw data) States without high-stakes tests: NAEP 1996 NAEP 2000 States with high-stakes tests: NAEP 1996 NAEP 2000 Alaska 278 n/a Alabama 256 262 Arizona 268 271 California 263 262 Arkansas 261 261 Delaware 267 n/a Colorado 276 n/a Florida 264 n/a Connecticut 280 282 Indiana 275 283 Georgia 262 266 Kentucky 267 272 Hawaii 262 263 Louisiana 252 259 Idaho n/a 278 Maryland 270 276 Illinois n/a 277 Massachusetts 277 283 Iowa 284 n/a Michigan 276 278 Kansas n/a 284 Mississippi 250 254 Maine 284 284 Missouri 274 274 Minnesota 284 288 Nevada n/a 268 Montana 283 287 New Mexico 262 260 Nebraska 283 281 New York 270 276 North Dakota 284 283 North Carolina 268 280 Oregon 277 281 Ohio n/a 283 Rhode Island 268 273 Oklahoma n/a 272 Tennessee 263 263 South Carolina 260 266 Utah 276 275 Texas 270 275 Vermont 279 283 Virginia 270 277 Washington 276 n/a West Virginia 265 271 Wisconsin 283 n/a Change in Score Change in Score Wyoming 275 277 OVERALL 275.5 276.7 +1.2* OVERALL 266.1 271.6 +5.4* *Significant at a p < .05 level Table 5 illustrates the states with high-stakes tests outperformed those states without high-stakes tests on the math NAEP grade 8 1996-2000. Again, we argue that the rates by which students are excluded from the NAEP must be taken into consideration to determine whether gains and losses are clear or unclear. Using the same rules as outlined above to determine clear and unclear gains and losses, we looked at only those states for which clear gains or losses are apparent (Note 3). An analysis of the data yields the following: Table 6 Eighth grade 1996-2000 NAEP mathematics scores with states coded as clear or unclear in their gains and losses. States without high-stakes tests NAEP 1996 NAEP 2000 States with high-stakes tests NAEP 1996 NAEP 2000 Alaska 278 n/a Alabama 256 262 Arizona 268 271 California 263 262 Arkansas 261 261 Delaware 267 n/a Colorado 276 n/a Florida 264 n/a Connecticut 280 282 Indiana 275 283 Georgia 262 266 Kentucky 267 272 Hawaii 262 263 Louisiana 252 259 Idaho n/a 278 Maryland 270 276 Illinois n/a 277 Massachusetts 277 283 Iowa 284 n/a Michigan 276 278 Kansas n/a 284 Mississippi 250 254 Maine 284 284 Missouri 274 274 Minnesota 284 288 Nevada n/a 268 Montana 283 287 New Mexico 262 260 Nebraska 283 281 New York 270 276 North Dakota 284 283 North Carolina 268 280 Oregon 277 281 Ohio n/a 283 Rhode Island 268 273 Oklahoma n/a 272 Tennessee 263 263 South Carolina 260 266 Utah 276 275 Texas 270 275 Vermont 279 283 Virginia 270 277 Washington 276 n/a West Virginia 265 271 Wisconsin 283 n/a Change in Score Change in Score Wyoming 275 277 OVERALL 271.1 271.9 +0.7 OVERALL 258.8 261.8 +3.0 After the states with clear effects are pulled out and analyzed, it seems that states with high-stakes tests are outperforming states without high-stakes tests. They are not, however, outperforming states without high-stakes tests at a statistically significant level. In addition, the scores posted by the clear states with high-stakes tests are not significantly different than the scores posted by the clear states without high-stakes tests. States with high-stakes tests are not outperforming states without high-stakes tests in math grade 8 performance. Again, what can also be drawn from Table 6 is that states with high-stakes tests are exempting more students from participating in the math grade 8 NAEP. Thirty-three percent of the states without high-stakes tests exempted more students and realized gains in math grade 8 NAEP scores. Fifty percent of the states with high-stakes tests exempted more students and realized gains in math grade 8 NAEP scores. This, again, supports our assertion that states with high-stakes tests are not gaining in NAEP scores simply because of their high-stakes testing policies. Conclusion In short, states with high-stakes tests seem to have outperformed states without high-stakes tests on the grade 4 math NAEP at a statistically significant level. However, gains between states with and without high stakes tests were not statistically different on the grade 4 reading or the grade 8 math NAEP. States with high-stakes tests are not outperforming states without high-stakes tests on both of these measures. In addition, the rates by which personnel in states with high-stakes tests are exempting students are increasing at a faster rate than they are in states without high-stakes tests. There may be an underlying characteristic other than high-stakes tests that is causing this phenomenon, but this would take further analyses. What we do know, however, is that for the most part the gains posted by states with high-stakes tests on two of the three NAEP tests are more related to the rates by which students are exempted from the tests than they are related to high-stakes tests themselves. We thank Professor Rosenshine for suggesting these alternative analytic techniques to us. In the end, for now, we remain unconvinced that the NAEP tests are showing much in the way of transfer effects. Given all the data we reported in our previous reports we remain unconvinced that the high-stakes tests used by states are showing systematic positive affects on audit tests used to assess transfer. References Amrein, A.L. & Berliner, D.C. (2002a, March 28). High-stakes testing, uncertainty, and student learning Education Policy Analysis Archives, 10(18). Retrieved July 24, 2003 from http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v10n18/. Amrein, A.L. & Berliner, D.C. (2002b). The impact of high-stakes tests on student academic performance: An analysis of NAEP results in states with high-stakes tests and ACT, SAT, and AP Test results in states with high school graduation exams. Tempe, AZ: Education Policy Studies Laboratory, Arizona State University. Retrieved July 24, 2003 from http://www.asu.edu/educ/epsl/EPRU/documents/EPSL-0211-126-EPRU.pdf. Rosenshine, B. (2003, August 4). High-stakes testing: Another analysis. Education Policy Analysis Archives, 11(24). Retrieved August 4, 2003 from http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v11n24/. About the Authors Audrey Amrein-Beardsley Email: audrey.beardsley@cox.net Audrey Amrein-Beardsley is a part-time Research and Evaluation Associate at a private foundation in Scottsdale, Arizona and a part-time researcher at Arizona State University. She received her PhD from Arizona State University in 2002 in Education Policy with an emphasis in Research Methodology. Her scholarly interests include the study of the intended and unintended consequences of high-stakes testing policies. To date, she has focused on the effects of high-stakes testing policies at a macro level given the frequency with which these policies are being implemented across the nation. David C. Berliner Regents' Professor of Education College of Education Arizona State University Tempe, AZ 85287-2411 Email: berliner@asu.edu David C. Berliner is Regents' Professor of Education at the College of Education of Arizona State University, in Tempe, AZ. He received his Ph.D. in 1968 from Stanford University in educational psychology, and has worked also at the University of Massachusetts, WestEd, and the University of Arizona. He has served as president of the American Educational Research Association (AERA), president of the Division of Educational Psychology of the American Psychological Association, and as a fellow of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences and a member of the National Academy of Education. Berliner's publications include The Manufactured Crisis, Addison-Wesley, 1995 (with B.J. Biddle) and The Handbook of Educational Psychology, Macmillan, 1996 (Edited with R.C. Calfee). Special awards include the Research into Practice Award of AERA, the National Association of Secondary School Principals Distinguished Service Award, and the Medal of Honor from the University of Helsinki. His scholarly interests include research on teaching and education policy analysis.

The World Wide Web address for the Education Policy Analysis Archives is epaa.asu.edu Editor: Gene V Glass, Arizona State University Production Assistant: Chris Murrell, Arizona State University General questions about appropriateness of topics or particular articles may be addressed to the Editor, Gene V Glass, glass@asu.edu or reach him at College of Education, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287-2411. The Commentary Editor is Casey D. Cobb: casey.cobb@unh.edu. EPAA Editorial Board Michael W. Apple University of Wisconsin David C. Berliner Arizona State University Greg Camilli Rutgers University Linda Darling-Hammond Stanford University Sherman Dorn University of South Florida Mark E. Fetler California Commission on Teacher Credentialing Gustavo E. Fischman California State Univeristy–Los Angeles Richard Garlikov Birmingham, Alabama Thomas F. Green Syracuse University Aimee Howley Ohio University Craig B. Howley Appalachia Educational Laboratory William Hunter University of Ontario Institute of Technology Patricia Fey Jarvis Seattle, Washington Daniel Kallós Umeå University Benjamin Levin University of Manitoba Thomas Mauhs-Pugh Green Mountain College Les McLean University of Toronto Heinrich Mintrop University of California, Los Angeles Michele Moses Arizona State University Gary Orfield Harvard University Anthony G. Rud Jr. Purdue University Jay Paredes Scribner University of Missouri Michael Scriven University of Auckland Lorrie A. Shepard University of Colorado, Boulder Robert E. Stake University of Illinois—UC Kevin Welner University of Colorado, Boulder Terrence G. Wiley Arizona State University John Willinsky University of British Columbia EPAA Spanish Language Editorial Board Associate Editor for Spanish Language Roberto Rodríguez Gómez Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México roberto@servidor.unam.mx Adrián Acosta (México) Universidad de Guadalajara adrianacosta@compuserve.com J. Félix Angulo Rasco (Spain) Universidad de Cádiz felix.angulo@uca.es Teresa Bracho (México) Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económica-CIDE bracho dis1.cide.mx Alejandro Canales (México) Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México canalesa@servidor.unam.mx Ursula Casanova (U.S.A.) Arizona State University casanova@asu.edu José Contreras Domingo Universitat de Barcelona Jose.Contreras@doe.d5.ub.es Erwin Epstein (U.S.A.) Loyola University of Chicago Eepstein@luc.edu Josué González (U.S.A.) Arizona State University josue@asu.edu Rollin Kent (México) Universidad Autónoma de Puebla rkent@puebla.megared.net.mx María Beatriz Luce(Brazil) Universidad Federal de Rio Grande do Sul-UFRGS lucemb@orion.ufrgs.br Javier Mendoza Rojas (México) Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México javiermr@servidor.unam.mx Marcela Mollis (Argentina) Universidad de Buenos Aires mmollis@filo.uba.ar Humberto Muñoz García (México) Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México humberto@servidor.unam.mx Angel Ignacio Pérez Gómez (Spain) Universidad de Málaga aiperez@uma.es Daniel Schugurensky(Argentina-Canadá) OISE/UT, Canada dschugurensky@oise.utoronto.ca Simon Schwartzman (Brazil) American Institutes for Resesarch–Brazil (AIRBrasil) simon@sman.com.br Jurjo Torres Santomé (Spain) Universidad de A Coruña jurjo@udc.es Carlos Alberto Torres (U.S.A.) University of California, Los Angeles torres@gseisucla.edu