The Allures and Illusions of Modernity:
Technology and Educational Reform in Egypt
Mark Warschauer
University of California, Irvine
Citation: Warschauer, M.,
(2003, October 17). The Allures and Illusions of Modernity: Technology
and Educational Reform in Egypt. Education Policy
Analysis Archives, 11(38).Retrieved [Date] from
http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v11n38/.
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Abstract
Much of the research to date on educational technology has
focused on its implementation in wealthy countries. Yet
instructional technology has a special allure in the developing
world, where it holds the promise not just of improving schools
but also of hastening modernization. This article examines a
national educational technology effort in Egypt, illuminating the
contradictions between the rhetoric of reform and the reality of
school practices. The analysis points to underlying political,
cultural, and economic factors that constrain attempts to improve
Egyptian schooling with technology.
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Educational technology has always been about much more than
improving learning. In the eyes of many proponents, it has been
about transforming learning -- overcoming traditional
educational approaches and supplanting them with revolutionary new
paradigms of teaching, learning, and schooling. The flashy new
machine in the classroom—whether the film projector or the
television or the computer—has represented the pinnacle of
modernity in the eyes of its supporters, whether from the
government, the business sector, or academia.
Larry Cuban (1986) has done an excellent job of chronicling
America’s 100-year love affair with gleaming new machines in
the classroom, from the radio to the computer lab. Each era has
experienced the same cycle of bold promises followed by erratic
and disappointing diffusion, with the technology eventually
finding a small niche on the margins of the educational process.
Where education has changed in the process, it has been in the
elite schools of the well-to-do that were disposed to reform in
the first place (Cuban, 1986; 1993b).
Now the cycle begins again, with the introduction of the
computer and the Internet. There has certainly been no shortage of
bold claims about how computers will revolutionize the classroom,
transforming the teacher from the stereotypic sage on the
stage to the new and equally stereotypic guide on the
side (Knapp & Glenn, 1996; Means, 1998; Mehlinger, 1996;
Sandholtz, Ringstaff, & Dwyer, 1997; Starr, 1996). Learners
will become autonomous and goal-directed, classrooms will become
centers of collaborative, critical inquiry, and technology will
have finally transformed schools to match the needs of the
information society (see, for example, Starr, 1996).
Research to date, however, makes such claims questionable. Most
studies show that the use of computers tends to amplify whatever
prior approaches and processes were already occurring in
classrooms, rather than transform them (e.g., Warschauer, 1999;
2000). For example, a recently completed four-year national US
study of “network science” – in which learners
from throughout the world collect and share scientific data over
the Internet – found that the projects tended to trivialize
rather than transform learning, unless they were based on
teacher-led practices of scientific inquiry in the individual
classrooms (Feldman, Konold, & Coulter, 2000).
In fairness, it is too early to judge the lasting impact of
computer and Internet technology in the classroom. Many people
believe that the computer and Internet have a more direct
relationship to fundamental changes in human communication and
cognition (see Harnad, 1991) and the overall organization of the
economy and society (see Castells, 1996; 1997; 1998) than did
previous technologies such as television or film. Thus even those
who have taken a hardheaded and realistic look at computers in the
classroom, such as Becker (2000; 1982) believe that under the
right conditions it may facilitate educational reform (Becker,
2000). Perhaps the best that can be said about this is that the
jury is still out.
Not surprisingly, the discussion to date of educational
technology has taken a US- and Euro-centric viewpoint. The
penetration of information and communication technologies (ICT) in
most of the rest of the world is much lower, whether in the
office, the shop floor, or the classroom. With only a small elite
having computer access, and the majority of their citizens living
on a few dollars a day (United Nations Development Programme,
2000), the developing countries in South Asia, Africa, and Latin
America have not yet been able to fill their classrooms with
computers and Internet connections.
However, the lack of modern technology does much to heighten
its allure in the developing world. There is much discussion of
the potential of new technologies to help countries leapfrog out
of underdevelopment. Just as Germany and Japan—with their
infrastructure destroyed after World War II—used a
completely new infrastructure to catch up to or even leap ahead of
other capitalist countries in efficiency of production, many
believe that the least developed countries can now make use of
information and communications technologies to skip over stages of
development (see discussion in Singh, 1999). And indeed, it is
precisely those countries that have been able to make effective
use of information technologies, such as Singapore, Korea, and
Taiwan, which have most recently progressed from underdevelopment
to the ranks of the wealthier countries. For developing nations,
information technology thus holds the allure of allowing rapid
entry to modernity.
A number of developing and middle-income countries in Latin
America, Asia, and Africa are now beginning to experiment with
information technology in the classroom. With the price of
computers and telecommunications falling, and schooling in many
countries badly needing improvement, developing countries have
great incentive to try to integrate new technologies and new
approaches (Osin, 1998). To date, though, little research or
analysis has been published on why or how developing countries are
attempting to make use of technology in schooling, or what the
results have been. The few exceptions to date have for the most
part been descriptions of model projects supported by
international donor agencies (e.g., Calderoni, 1998; Potashnik,
1996). Though these reports have been helpful, they tend to focus
on best practices rather than shedding light on actual practices.
The lack of broader and more in-depth analysis of educational
technology practices in developing countries can unfortunately
lead to a situation whereby educators in those countries
uncritically mimic the practices (or what they may falsely believe
to be the practices) of wealthy countries, without proper regard
to local conditions and circumstances, thus worsening rather than
solving problems. Such counterproductive approaches are heightened
by the fears of being left behind in the information revolution
(see discussion in Agre, 1997).
To help overcome this lack of information on educational
technology in the developing world, I carried out a three-year
qualitative study in Egypt. Though, as in any such study, the
findings apply in particular to the situation under investigation,
Egypt represents an excellent example of a society poised on the
edge between underdevelopment and modernity (see, for example, New
and Old: A Survey of Egypt, 1999).
The study focused on the policies and practices of integrating
technology in education in governmental K-12 schools, under the
leadership of the Egyptian Ministry of Education. The overall unit
of analysis for this study is the governmental K-12 educational
sector in Egypt. Where relevant, I also consider data from other
educational units in Egypt, including K-12 private schools,
governmental and private universities, and non-governmental
community technology centers. Data sources for the study included
the following:
- Participant observation: I engaged in
participation-observation continuously for three years, from
1998-2001, while I was involved in a donor-funded educational
project in Egypt. During this time, I participated in efforts to
plan, implement, and evaluate technology-based interventions in
Egyptian schools and inservice and pre-service teacher education
programs. My participation included attendance at meetings of
Ministry of Education bodies, international donor and
implementation agencies, and Egyptian non-governmental
organizations, as well as attendance at and participation in
in-service and preservice teacher training programs. It also
included professional visits to 25 Egyptian primary, preparatory
(i.e., middle), and secondary schools located in rural and urban
areas throughout the country and to colleges of education in 10
Egyptian universities, and participation in meetings and training
sessions among Egyptian educators. I took notes during these
visits and sessions and afterwards typed them up in personal and
professional reports. Finally, I have participated in various
electronic discussion forums of Egyptian educators focused on use
of technology in education.
- Interviews and focus groups: I conducted approximately
100 individual interviews with Ministry of Education (MOE)
officials, business leaders, representatives of non-governmental
organizations, parents, and students. I also organized about ten
focus group meetings of six-to-ten K-12 teachers and faculty
members at colleges of education to discuss the integration of
technology in classrooms and programs. I took notes during these
interviews and focus group meetings and typed them in personal and
professional reports following the interviews and meetings. The
interviews and focus groups were organized within the context of
my work in Egypt and addressed issues related to access to
technology at educational sites, skill and knowledge level of
educators, and goals and objectives of using technology with
students and in professional development programs.
- Analysis of documents. I have collected and analyzed a
wide array of documents and reports issued by the Egyptian
government and MOE, donor agencies, and non-governmental bodies.
While the majority of these are in print, they also include
electronic documents, such as Websites of MOE bodies and
schools.
The study draws on critical approaches to research on infusion
of information and communication technologies (Warschauer, 1998).
A critical theory of technology (see Feenberg, 1991) distinguishes
itself from both determinist approaches (which view
technology as of necessity having a positive or negative impact)
and instrumental approaches (which view technology as a
valueless tool which can be deployed toward any end), and critical
approaches. (Determinist approaches are alternatively referred to
as substantive approaches or autonomous approaches (see, for
example, the work of Ellul, 1980). Instrumental approaches are
alternatively referred to as neutralist approaches and are often
backed by technologists; see discussion in Shallis (1984).) Both
determinist and instrumental approaches are seen as downplaying
the embednesses of social, political, economic, and culture
factors in technologies, which shape (but do not determine) how
technologies are deployed. In a critical approach, technology is
viewed as a site of struggle, and investigations of technology
implementation seek to uncover underlying power relations that
shape how technology is used, similarly, for example, to how
critical literacy studies seek to uncover the underlying power
relations framing literacy practices (e.g., Street, 1984;
1993).
In reporting on the study, I will focus on three aspects: (1)
the discourses of technology-based educational reform, (2) the
practices of educational technology, and (3) the social context of
education and technology which helps explain the (mis)match
between discourse and practice. First, though, I will briefly
introduce some necessary background information on Egypt.
Egypt at the Turn of the Millennium
I decided to conduct this study during my first week in Egypt,
as I stood on the banks of the Nile and took in the Cairo
landscape. Across the Nile, I saw the glimmering towers of the
World Trade Center, including some of the fanciest stores,
restaurants, and offices of modern Egypt. Looking down, though, I
also saw a poor family of eight who lived in three tiny boats by
the bank of the Nile. Thin and poorly clothed, this family
apparently spent their days and nights on a couple of tiny canoes
no longer than a fishing pole. Yet, as I looked down, I saw a
shiny object in the center boat, and, upon looking more closely, I
realized it was a battery-operated television. Even this
impoverished family living in tiny canoes on a highly-polluted
river was grasping at modernization through media. This contrast
within contrasts was an excellent introduction to me of Egypt
today. Egypt is rushing toward modernization, while at the same
time modernization must conform itself to the centuries-old ways
of life of Egyptian society.
The use of technology in education in Egypt is situated in a
broader social and educational reform movement that dates to the
early 1990s. In 1992, the Egyptian government, backed by the World
Bank and International Monetary Fund-backed structural adjustment
program, launched an ambitious structural adjustment program
(Korayem, 1997). The ongoing program seeks to transform the
previously stagnant, insular semi-socialist economy inherited from
the Nasser era into a modern, transparent, and efficient economy
that can compete in a global market (Galal, 1995; Sachs, 1996).
The reform process has shown some positive results; Egypt’s
gross national product grew on an average of 5.4% annually from
1995-2000 (based on data available from the World Bank, available
at http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query/), up from an average
of 1.5% in 1990-1995 (Galal, 1995). This growth has brought Egypt
from the ranks of the least developed countries up to the lower
medium-development countries, ranking at 119 out of 174 countries
according to the United Nations Development Programme’s
Human Development Index, with a gross domestic product of $3041
per person (GDP is calculated by the UNDP according to
purchasing power parity, i.e., how many equivalent goods
can actually be purchased in a country), an average life
expectancy of 66.7 years, and an infant mortality rate of 6.9%
(United Nations Development Programme, 2000).
In spite of some areas of improvement, Egypt is still troubled
by high rates of poverty, reflected by a low literacy rate and
poor public health in urban and rural areas, and the financial
structures of the state are far from being fully reformed or
stable (Institute of National Planning, 1998; New and old: A
survey of Egypt, 1999). The structural adjustment program thus
continues with the goal of modernizing the economy, overcoming
social exclusion and poverty, and bring Egypt to the economic
level of middle-income countries such as Malaysia and eventually
to that of newly-industrialized countries such as Korea.
In no other arena is the need for institutional reform and
social inclusion greater than in education. There is wide
consensus among both educators (e.g., Jarrar & Massialas,
1992; Tawila, Lloyd, Bensch, & Wassef, 2000) and economists
(e.g., Bartsch, 1995; Fergany, 1998) about the poor performance of
Egyptian schools, even when compared to that of other developing
countries (Birdsall & Lesley, 1999). Problems identified
include large class sizes, often exceeding 45 students per class
in urban schools; poorly trained teachers with low wages and
status; and a centralized, test-driven curriculum focusing on rote
memorization of unimportant material (Jarrar & Massialas,
1992; Ministry of Education, 1993; Tawila et al., 2000). These
problems are reflected in a $2 billion private-tutoring industry
that is half the size of government expenditures on public
education (see discussion in Birdsall & Lesley, 1999). In
effect, teachers have a disincentive to teach well, since they
earn for more than their governmental salary by tutoring their own
students privately to make up for what they failed to learn in
school.
The expense and low quality of education have contributed to a
high dropout rate in primary school (Fergany, Farmaz, & Wissa,
1996) and a corresponding low rate of adult literacy (53.7%
overall and only 41.8% of women, United Nations Development
Programme, 2000). They also lead to a low-skill level and
employment potential among those who complete school; two studies
claim that high school graduates in Egypt who don’t go on to
university have less earning potential than people who have only
partially completed primary school (Bartsch, 1995; Fergany,
1998).
The problems of education in Egypt are systemic and stem from a
wide variety of causes, including the poor state of education
following the era of British colonial influence, the rapid
population growth rate which overwhelms limited resources, and the
priorities of the previous Nasserist system which emphasized the
quantity of schools rather than their quality (Jarrar &
Massialas, 1992). Also of note is the limited demand for
education, at least in the past, due to the poor-performing
Nasserist economy (Birdsall & Lesley, 1999). With economic
reform and growth major governmental priorities, there is now
widespread recognition in Egypt that poor-performing schools are a
drag on socio-economic development and that educational change is
critical.
ICT in Egypt
The other major contextual factor shaping technology use in
education is the general growth and role of information and
communication technologies (ICT) in Egypt today. Egypt began
emphasizing the adaptation and integration of ICT in the early
1990s. Expansion of ICT is viewed as critical for modernizing
production, distribution, and marketing efforts and thus assisting
Egypt in competing successfully in the global market (Mintz,
1999). Egyptian government and business leaders also hope that the
information technology sector will become an important industry in
its own regard, and they often point to India and Israel as models
that they would hope to emulate. Egypt has thus placed major
emphasis on ICT, and Egypt is reputed to be one of the fastest
growing ICT markets in the world. New communications media in
Egypt include the Internet, mobile telephony, and digital
satellite television.
The Internet. The Internet was first introduced
to Egypt in 1993, when a small university network was established
(Information technology in Egypt, 1998). Commercial Internet use
began three years later and has developed with more government
support and less censorship than in many other Mideast countries,
reaching a total of some 600,000 Internet users by 2001 (NUA,
2003), representing about 1% of the population. The growth of the
Internet in Egypt is constrained by economic factors in a country
where per capita income is roughly $120 per month (World Bank,
2001). This is compounded by the fact that local telephone calls
cost $1-$3 an hour, making frequent Internet use expensive even
for the small middle class. Low teledensity rates – 6%
nationally (United Nations Development Programme, 2000) and only
2% in rural areas (Badawi, 2000, July)-- mean that people do not
have telephones to log on, and only about 1% of the population own
computers (United Nations Development Programme, 2000). The
Internet is thus inaccessible to Egypt’s poor, and even many
in the small middle class must resort to coping mechanisms, such
as sharing Internet accounts or using Internet cafés.
Economics is not the only factor restricting access to the
Internet. Other major factors are the high illiteracy rate and
language usage. The Internet largely arose in Egypt in
English-language milieu, including the country’s small
high-tech and international and foreign business sectors, and to
this day common standards of Arabic language computing and
communications have not been reached. That means that the vast
majority of Web sites and computer-mediated communication is
conducted in English (Warschauer, Refaat, & Zohry, 2000). This
presents less of a problem for the Egyptian elite, many of who
have studied in English medium schools and can thus read and write
the language as well as Arabic. However, English is taught very
poorly in public schools, so the vast majority of the people do
not know it at all.
Wireless telephony. Egypt has also tried to
extend its new media through wireless telephony. The number of
lines grew to more than 1 million in four years (El-Nawawy, 2000),
thus swamping Internet growth. The higher rate of wireless
telephone use compared to Internet use is due to a variety of
reasons, including language (telephone communication is done in
Arabic), initial investment (a wireless phone is much less
expensive than a computer), and the familiarity of phone use.
Wireless telephony penetration has reportedly tripled again from
2000 to 2002 to reach three million lines (Arab Communication
Consult, 2002), or about five percent of the population.
Satellite television. Finally, the government has
invested heavily in the development and launching of two digital
television satellites, Nilesat 101 and Nilesat 102, with some 180
stations, as another medium of high-tech communications. Nilesat
is designed to serve developmental goals through its emphasis on
educational program (see discussion below). Nevertheless, with
reception requiring not only a television and satellite, but also
a $400 digital receiver, Nilesat is believed to have very few
subscribers to date (Sakr, 1999).
In summary, then though new information and communications
media have grown rapidly, they remain accessible only to a few
percent of the Egyptian population. The urban and rural poor in
most need of access to information and communication resources are
excluded from the new media.
It is not surprising that in Egypt, as elsewhere, information
and communication technologies are being used principally by those
with money. This reflects the natural amplifying affect of the ICT
throughout the world: those with financial, human, and social
capital have better access to ICT, which they can use to further
enhance their financial, human, and social capital. And indeed, no
matter how well motivated the Egyptian government or private
sector were, there is no way they could instantaneously put
computer, Internet connections, mobile telephones, and satellite
televisions in the homes of Egyptians poor.
Nevertheless, at an institutional level, governments can deploy
ICT to serve broader developmental goals. In Egypt, the main
sector in which Egypt has attempted to deploy ICT for broader
development purposes is education. The discourses of
technology-based educational reform, and their practices, will now
be discussed.
Discourses of Technology-Based Reform
The Government of Egypt believes that it has found a perfect
combination in technology and educational reform. It has an
ambitious and expensive plan to use ICT to help overcome the
country’s educational problems while simultaneously
preparing a technologically-skilled workforce to meet the demands
of the 21st century.
The Ministry of Education (MOE) initiated its national plan for
the technological development of education in 1994. A special unit
within the MOE, called the Technology Development Center (TDC) was
formed shortly thereafter to coordinate the MOE’s effort to
infuse technology into schools.
The goals of the national technology in education plan have
been laid out in a number of publications issued by in the name of
the TDC (e.g., Technology Development Center, 1997), the MOE
(e.g., Ministry of Education, 1999), and the Minister of
Education, Dr. Hussein Kamel Bahaa El Din (e.g., Bahaa El Din,
1997). These publications adopt the rhetoric of globalization,
modernization, and reform, with a focus on three areas. First,
there is the discourse of technology-based economic
competition: As noted by the TDC (1997),
The whole world is undergoing an overwhelming
technological revolution in information, electronics, computers,
and communication. This revolution will widen the gap between the
developed and underdeveloped countries. Those who master science
and technology and manage information will survive, those who do
not will perish, at least economically. Egypt must race against
time so that it can jump on the wagon of the elite of the
developed world before it is to late (p. 79).
The TDC goes on to explain that only through the infusion of
modern technology in schools can this economic challenge be
met.
Following on the heels of economic competition is the discourse
of educational transformation. As Bahaa El Din (1997)
writes,
This emphasis [on technology] will have a
transformative effect on education.…The information
explosion has changed education from a mode of memorization of a
certain amount of knowledge to one in which students are expected
to research and apply the knowledge they acquire to various life
situations. Education will change from one that focuses on
memorization to one that focuses on research, analysis,
identification of relationships in the data, and potential
application.
A sub-component of the discourse of educational transformation
is that of autonomous learning. In MOE publications, multimedia
laboratories, compact discs, the Internet, videoconference fiber
optic networks, virtual reality, and electronic libraries will all
provide learning resources so that students can engage in
learner-centered experimentation, experiential learning, and
critical thinking (Bahaa El Din, 1997; Technology Development
Center, 1997).
Finally, the technology plans also emphasize equal opportunity
for all. Distance education efforts, backed by the deployment of
mobile technology caravans, are intended to bring educational
resources to underserved students and thus bolster basic education
and literacy (Technology Development Center, 1997).
The Government of Egypt (GOE) and MOE have assembled an
impressive array of resources toward meeting these goals,
including more than 600 full-time staff working for the TDC. The
major technology projects involve computers and the Internet,
satellite television, and video conferencing.
Computers and Internet: The TDC has placed
multimedia rooms in all secondary and preparatory (i.e., middle)
schools in Egypt and many primary schools. These rooms have 2-3
high-end computers, LCD devices for projecting from a computer to
a screen, collections of educational software, and access to the
Internet. These rooms are to be resources areas for teachers who
can bring in their classes on a sign-up basis. Much of the school
curriculum has been transferred to CD format for use in these
multimedia rooms.
In addition to the multimedia rooms, secondary schools also
have computer laboratories with 10-15 DOS or Windows computers.
These courses are used for teaching an elective subject course
called “computing” which is designed to cover basic
operation and programming skills.
Satellite Television: Ten of the Nilesat
television stations have been dedicated to educational program.
Ministry of Education staff are creating educational television
programs for seven of these stations based on the national
curriculum. (The other three stations have been dedicated to the
Ministry of Higher Education). Televisions, satellites, and
digital receivers have been installed in the above-mentioned
multimedia rooms in approximately ten thousand schools to
facilitate access to the programming.
Videoconferencing Facilities: A national
multipoint videoconference facility has been established, with
videoconference training centers of 100-200 seats in each of
Egypt’s 27 governorates. The facilities are principally used
for national teacher training programs and for national
communications between Ministry of Education staff. The facilities
allow participants in these programs to project from any site to
all the other sites.
Practices of Educational Technology
The funds spent on information and communication technology
represent a major investment for a developing country. What then
are the results of this investment, and how do they match the
MOE’s lofty goals for technology in education?
Unfortunately, results to date are unsatisfactory in all areas.
Technology has been thrust on top of a mostly dysfunctional
system, rather than used to help transform that system. The
Technology Development Center itself is an add-on to the Ministry
of Education that grabs up a huge portion of Ministry resources
but appears to coordinate poorly with other sections of the
Ministry, such as the departments of secondary or basic education
or the department for inservice training. Serious problems have
emerged in each of the three program areas:
Computers and Internet
The computers in the multimedia rooms, with 2-3 computers per
school, seem to be spread too thin to make any difference. In any
case, the rooms are often locked up, as local school authorities
don’t want to suffer the risk of having expensive equipment
damaged. Classroom visitors representing donor agencies usually
are given a special showcase presentation in a computer room. But,
during those same visits, when I inspected the use logs, it was
clear that many of the multimedia rooms in the schools I visited
are rarely used outside of these formal visits. This phenomenon
has frequently been reported often in the press. As one article
(PCs and teachers omitted from new computer science curriculum,
2000) exclaimed,
Primary School teacher Hasnaa el-Hefnawi is enraged by
the decision to introduce the computer science
curriculum…The ministry has repeatedly tooted its own horn
about how many computers it has supplied to schools.
“Doesn’t the minister realize that these computers are
kept in school warehouses like antiques or used merely for
decoration” she mused (p. 2).
This sentiment was echoed by a teacher on an e-mail list of
Egyptian educators, who complained about the technology
gatekeepers at his own school, “And the good people know
only how to unplug and cover it to protect the computer from dust
so as not to be damaged.”
During my visits to schools, when students did use these
multimedia rooms, they usually sat and watched the teacher
lecturing, as usual, but this time with the aid of a CD for
presentation. The CDs themselves contain the exact same material
as the textbooks, transferred to a new medium, with little
attention given to principles of interactivity or participatory
learning. Teachers who attempt to use the computers in more
creative ways, even by making their own Microsoft Word or
Microsoft PowerPoint files, have told me that they were warned
that any activity other than using the Ministry-provided software
is prohibited so as to protect against viruses.
Meanwhile, the laboratories of 10-15 computers are used for a
course in basic computer literacy, which focuses for the most part
on mastering DOS (or, in some cases, Windows) commands. Teachers
of that class, as of other classes, told me that they are not
allowed to depart from the prepared curriculum, nor are they
prepared to do so based on knowledge, background, or training.
The laboratories themselves, which could potentially offer a site
for creative hands-on use by students in other subjects or after
school, are generally forbidden to be used for anything other than
the specified computer literacy courses, at least in the schools
that I visited.
Finally, Internet access is routed by telephone via MOE Offices
to ensure better control. This necessitates a double-connection
process that rarely functions. In any case, in the schools that I
visited, only the official in charge of the multimedia room was
given the Internet account information, and neither classroom
teachers nor students were allowed to access the Internet
independently.
Satellite Television
The MOE rushed to transfer its entire curriculum to satellite
television programming, similar to how it transferred the
curriculum to CD format. In Egypt, the textbook is the
curriculum, so this has too often meant simply converting an
unappealing textbook into a similarly unappealing television
program. Scriptwriters with more creative ideas have had their
efforts rejected by the directors who are under pressure to
develop an enormous amount of television material in a short
amount of time. In any case, educational programming on
satellite television appears to be rarely viewed, since relatively
few people have bought a digital receiver at home and there is
little reason to interrupt a class to bring students into a
crowded television room to watch the same material that is found
in their book.
Interactive Videoconferencing
The videoconference centers are used for teacher training, but
the trainings that I have observed and heard about were more often
based on lengthy talking head lectures from Cairo rather than real
interaction. Scheduled videoconference trainings are frequently
interrupted when the system breaks down or when top Ministry
officials take over the system to communicate with subordinates
around the country or to showcase the facilities to international
visitors.
The ineffective use of videoconferencing parallels a broader
problem with teacher training in new technology. Such training is
generally reserved for the school computer specialists, and is
generally limited to computer operations. The computer specialists
have had no training in assisting teachers to make use of
computers in teaching. Teachers themselves know little about
either the pedagogy of instructional technology or even basic
computer operations. As one university lecturer explained to me,
“we have the hardware, we have the software, but we lack the
humanware.”
The problems with educational technology in Egypt are widely
known and are reported frequently in the press (e.g., PCs and
teachers omitted from new computer science curriculum, 2000). The
ill-suited expenditures on technology—with the emphasis on
hardware and software and inattention to promoting effective use
of technology by skilled practitioners--serve to deepen public
cynicism for the government and the Ministry of Education.
Educational Reform?
How then do these efforts stack up against Egypt’s
developmental goals of modernization, educational reform, and
social inclusion? Though modernization and reform are the
raison d’être of using technology in schools,
the funds spent on technology have not served that purpose. Basic
steps, such as using e-mail networks to facilitate coordination
among teachers, have been ignored, in favor of high-profile but
ill-suited expenditures. The Ministry rushes from one high-tech
scheme to another, in recent years, rushing to transfer content to
CD-ROMs, digital satellite television programs, and streaming
video. In all cases, the content remains more or less the same,
and the instruction is top-down, without engaging the type of
interaction and inquiry among teachers and learners that the
Ministry itself says is necessary for educational improvement
(see, for example, Bahaa El Din 1997). The same top-down hierarchy
permeates the TDC as other sections of the Ministry, giving
classroom teachers—let alone students—little
opportunity to exercise independent initiative.
In short, the curriculum, the exams, the teaching methods, and
the need for expensive private tutoring have all remained the
same. On a few occasions, ICT provides an alternate delivery
mechanism, but the methods and content and approach to education
have not substantially changed. ICT has not appeared to contribute
in any meaningful way to reform and modernization of
education.
There is also concern that ICT expenditures could be deepening
social inequality. A major hindrance to Egypt’s development
is its unequal education system, and the resulting poor human
capital development among the urban and rural poor, especially
rural girls. The high rate of illiteracy in Egypt, especially
among girls, is a major brake on development. Economists and
development specialists believe that Egypt’s educational
expenditures are skewed to the well-off, and that Egypt spends an
insufficient amount of its overall education pie on basic
education and literacy promotion (Birdsall & Lesley, 1999;
Institute of National Planning, 1998)
Not surprisingly, the investments in ICT have done little to
overcome this bias and have likely worsened it. Egypt’s
investment in ICT, as in other countries, goes to those sectors
best able to absorb it. When Egypt needs to be investing more in
rural, primary education, ITC spending is skewed toward
universities and secondary schools, which are located
disproportionately in urban areas. With a mean years of schooling
rate of 5.0 years (Fergany, 1998), much of the population never
reaches the secondary schools that are absorbing the technological
resources. A new effort to provide computers to university
students at below-market prices is laudable on paper but will also
put computing resources in the hands of those who can most afford
them on their own. The expensive videoconferencing centers are
based in governmental capital cities and draw money away from
other types of school-based teacher training programs that could
be spread more equitably around the country. In sum, the vast
majority of spending on ICT is apparently going toward secondary
and higher urban education, rather than toward improved primary
rural education that could help combat illiteracy in Egypt.
In addition, an emphasis on ICT in education has tended to
privilege the use of English over Arabic. Whereas textbooks
available in Egyptian schools are all available in Arabic, much
computing in Egypt takes place in English – due to English
language computer science terms, English operating systems,
English resources on the Internet, etc. (Warschauer et al., 2002).
An increased emphasis on English—including the introduction
of English in primary schools—has thus far borne little
fruit (due to a lack of trained teachers, overcrowded classrooms,
etc.), but has disadvantaged those students in rural primary
schools who now have less time and opportunity to work toward
gaining literacy in Arabic.
The Social Context of Educational Reform and Technology
It is not surprising that Egypt’s educational technology
effort has fallen short of its goals. Countries such as the United
States, that have been spending a great deal more money on
educational computing for a much longer period of time, are still
far from getting it right. The learning curve for intelligent use
of technology is a long and steep one, and there is no reason to
expect Egypt to outperform other countries in this regard.
However, it is worth analyzing the Egyptian case in more detail
to interpret the social context of educational technology
difficulties. This may shed light on the broader issue mentioned
at the beginning of this article as to whether the infusion of
technology constitutes a lever for reform.
I believe the evidence of this study strongly supports the
socialization view articulated by Cuban (1986; 1993a; 1993b) and
others (e.g., Spindler, 1974) that gives priority emphasis to the
broader social shaping role of schools. According to this view,
deeply-held cultural beliefs about the nature of knowledge, how
teaching should occur, and how children should learn steer
policymakers and teachers toward certain forms of instruction, and
that these forms of instruction are guided by the broader role of
the schools to "inculcate into children the prevailing social
norms, values, and behaviors that will prepare them for economic,
social, and political participation in the larger culture" (Cuban
1993, p. 249). From this perspective, educational reform is not
impossible, but tends to be available most often to the more
privileged strata of society. Reforms affecting the masses are
usually carried out in fringe ways, without disrupting the overall
socialization function of the schools.
In this regard, it is useful to explore the broader social
context that frames education in Egypt, and see how this framework
constrains educational reform with computers. Three aspects will
be examined: the political, the cultural, and the
economic.
The Politics of School Reform
The political context of Egypt reflects a strong carry-over
from the Nasser period, based on authoritarian rule by a
military-backed leadership within a patriotic, nationalist
framework (Hinnebusch, 1990). Egyptians enjoy neither freedom of
speech, nor freedom of organization, nor freedom of organization
and protest. Strikes and demonstrations are disallowed, those
expressing contrary political or religious views are jailed, and
formation of political parties and non-governmental organizations
is restricted (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1998-99). The
current president, Hosni Mubarak, has been in power since 1981,
and the country has been under Emergency Law during the entire
time of his rule.
What then is the political role of schooling in Egypt, dating
back to the Nasser regime? It is largely to forge a national
identity based on mass access to (formally) equal schooling (see
Jarrar & Massialas, 1992 for a history of Egypt’s
educational policies). Nasser brought huge numbers of children
into the Egyptian school system, and construction of new schools
continues to be a major priority of the current government (and
deservedly so). However, dating back to the days of Nasser, any
reform which allowed differences to emerge in schools, or which
lessened the authoritarian hierarchy of the educational system,
was highly suspect.
Today’s political leaders, like Nasser, see schooling
largely from the view of social control. Though the Islamist
fundamentalist movement in Egypt is under greater control than it
was in the 1990s, Islamist opposition remains a threat to the
government, just as it has for the last 50 years (and, indeed, may
grow due to public frustration with regional political events). In
such a climate, a main function of schooling in Egypt, in the eyes
of the regime, is to foster pro-government sentiment and to
isolate the Egyptian fundamentalists. Toward this end, the
appearance of modernization has proven very attractive. By
constantly emphasizing how many computers it has put in schools
and how advanced its videoconference system is, the government
goes on the offensive to show that it represents the future and
that it can compete with the wealthiest countries in the world.
However, to actually use this equipment to reshape
schooling would pose too much of a threat to a fundamentally
conservative institution. So the system – beyond the wishes
and desires of any particular individual – supports a
rhetoric of reform without its substance. This is not due to the
conspiracy of an elite, but rather due to the institutional
reproduction of an educational and social system similar to that
which occurs throughout the world.
The Culture of School Reform
For a variety of historical, political, social, economic, and
religious reasons, a culture of vertical hierarchy permeates Egypt
and the Arab world. Information is meant to be horded, decisions
are made at the top, and rulers maintain power through a complex
balance of power techniques. This hierarchical system, which de
Atkine (2000) found to be evident in the Egyptian military, also
pervades other social systems in the country (see discussion in
Hudson, 2000). And indeed, an almost militaristic like atmosphere
pervades the Ministry of Education, especially as it affects the
use of technology. All three top leaders of the Technology
Development Center are former military generals (none, by the way,
with a background in education), and former corporals,
lieutenants, and other officers are found below them. Computers
are found on none of their desks, except as monitoring devices,
i.e., to observe educational videoconferencing sessions organized
within the Ministry. The TDC, like other governmental and MOE
departments, is hierarchical to the extreme, with long chains of
command, and those at any level but the top unable to make
decisions. For example, on one occasion, I made a simple request
of a teacher to see a copy of the CD that he uses in school. The
request was bounced up one level after the other, with no one
lower than the Vice-Minister of education willing to grant
permission. (The Vice-Minister finally said yes.)
In such an atmosphere, it is not surprising that technology
serves a purpose of hierarchy and transmission, rather than of
horizontal networking (see discussion of this same issue in US
education in Hodas, 1993). Though the MOE and TDC adopt the
discourse of interactive education, the spending and support
– whether on satellite television, or CDs, or top-down
training via videoconferencing – has gone almost entirely to
transmission technologies.
The Economics of School Reform
Egypt, like many developing countries, is highly stratified,
yet that stratification is expressed in a special way. Due to the
land reforms and other programs of the Nasser regime, income
inequality and land inequality are relatively low.
Education inequality, however, is quite high, even when compared
to other developing countries. Data gathered by Birdsall and
O’Connell (1999) illustrates this point (see table 1).
Table 1. Sources of Inequality Across Countries (Gini
coefficients c. 1990)
|
Country
|
Income Inequality
|
Education Inequality
|
Land Inequality
|
|
Egypt
|
.320
|
.700
|
.480
|
|
Kenya
|
.544
|
.600
|
.746
|
|
Jordan
|
.407
|
.615
|
.686
|
|
Brazil
|
.596
|
.461
|
.852
|
|
Indonesia
|
.317
|
.494
|
.556
|
|
Korea
|
.336
|
.257
|
.351
|
|
Thailand
|
.515
|
.456
|
.366
|
Source: Birdsall and O’Connel, 1999
In other words, control of education—much more so than in
other countries—is a principle means by which the well-to-do
in Egypt defend their privileged social status. And the social
status achieved through education means a great deal in Egypt. It
allows people to join the highest paying and most prestigious
professions, it is a de facto requirement for setting up your own
business, and it is a prerequisite for marriage within the elite
and thus enjoying the financial and social benefits showered on
family members by the Egyptian upper class.
The defense of social status through elite education takes
place through several means. First, a disproportionate share of
funding goes to university education as opposed to K-12 education
(Birdsall & Lesley, 1999; Fergany, 1998; Institute of National
Planning, 1998). Secondly, socioeconomic privilege is reserved for
those who complete the university; as mentioned earlier, those who
graduate secondary school without a university education are
actually worse off economically than primary school drop-outs
unless they choose to work outside Egypt (Bartsch, 1995). Third,
access to universities – and to the most elite departments
or programs within the universities – is based on a set of
decontextualized school-leaving exams that the wealthy have been
preparing for all their lives, through their better private
schools and their expensive private tutoring.
This class bias that permeates Egypt’s educational system
makes school reform extremely difficult to achieve. The Ministry
of Education has attempted to disrupt the testing and private
tutoring system for years, but has been continually rebuffed by a
powerful elite who have invested huge sums in preparing their
children to pass the exams and gain access to the elite (see
Sarhaddi Nelson, 2001) and who thus have little interest in seeing
such a system overturned.
This economic elite who exercise a powerful influence over
Egyptian politics have little interest in technology-based school
reform in governmental schools. Their children are already
becoming computer-proficient at home, and for them the schools
serve as little more than a sorting system to maintain their class
privilege.
Meanwhile the poor have little vested interest in demanding
computers in the schools. The struggle of the poor is for decent
basic education that will allow their children to read and write
and compete fairly in society. With class sizes of upwards of 60
in the poor neighborhoods of Cairo, and many urban and rural
schools lacking basic amenities, the poor have other priorities
than computers and the Internet in schools, which are widely
viewed as a boondoggle. There is thus no constituency that is
fighting hard to reform schools through infusions of
technology.
In summary then, there are powerful political, cultural, and
economic factors motivating the current structure of education in
Egypt. Large-scale spending on information technology has had
little if any impact on changing these factors, and it is
unrealistic to expect that it will. The emphasis on the
façade of reform without any substantial changes is evident
throughout the educational system. The Ministry began teaching
English in elementary school in order to emphasize modernization
and ties to the West, but this instruction has almost no value
because the majority of those designated to teach English in
primary school know little of the language itself. (Indeed, a
committee of Egyptian applied linguistics, several with expertise
in the field of English language teaching, recommended against the
change to earlier English language education.) The Ministry, at
huge expense and often with the support of donor funding, also
sends thousands of teachers per year to the United States and
Britain to expose them to Western environments and approaches, but
makes it difficult for these same teachers to implement any
substantial changes when they return (Warschauer, 2003b). In other
words, whether in English teaching, teacher training, or use of
technology, a higher priority is put on creating the illusion of
modernization rather than on actually modernizing practices.
Finally, though beyond the scope of this particular work, the
role of donor agencies must also be briefly mentioned. For
example, the United States Agency for International Development
has long made Egypt one of its largest recipients, principally for
global political reasons (Weinbaum, 1986). In too many cases, the
US and other donors have poured money into expensive
infrastructure projects in Egypt, including those related to
technology in education, without paying sufficient attention to
how technology might actually be best used in local contexts (see
discussion in Warschauer, 2003a, 2003b).
Conclusion
While the large gap between rhetoric and reality of
technology-based educational reform in Egypt stems in part from
poor planning, it is also the logical outcome of powerful
socioeconomic factors that shape educational policy and practice
in Egypt. Though Egyptian officials voice the discourses of reform
popularized in the West, it is unlikely that they will be widely
practiced in Egypt (and, indeed, it is questionable how often they
are actually practiced in Western countries.) Egypt would do
better to draw on its own social norms in designing educational
reform policies. Holliday (1992; 1994) has demonstrated that the
best classroom instruction in Egypt is teacher-centered,
reflecting the social and cultural realities of Egypt rather than
the learner-centered environment favored in US graduate schools of
education; most Egyptians believe that their educators should
organize “teaching spectacles” featuring top-down
instruction rather than “learning festivals” based on
collaborative project-work (Holliday, 1994, p. 36). If and when
educational technology begins to make positive headway in Egypt,
it will be in a way that is likely very different than a
Western-based discourse might suggest. Indeed, the US has its own
share of educational problems, and many countries with traditions
of teacher-centered education, such as Korea, Singapore, and
Taiwan, have shown great success in raising the educational level
of their students.
As for the more general conclusion, this study provides support
for the work of Cuban and others who emphasize the limited impact
of machines in reforming education. In Egypt, as in the US,
technology can play a role in remaking education only if an when
broader social, political, cultural, and economic factors are
aligned to make school reform likely. This does not suggest a
fatalistic approach that denies human agency, but it does imply
that technology is something other than a neutral tool that can be
deployed toward any ends. It is better to think of information and
communication technologies as “socio-technical
networks” (Kling, 2000, p. 3) that involve complex social
relationships and contexts.
In other words, those who seek to reshape schools, whether in
Egypt, the US, or elsewhere, need to think about not only the
technology of the classroom, but also the technology of
informational capitalism. Globalization, post-Fordism industrial
relations, and the advent of new communications media are changing
the context of education in the US, other Western countries, and,
increasingly, in the developing world. These broader economic
shifts may well introduce a greater demand for a more educated (or
differently-educated) workforce in Egypt, and there are already
signs that the business community in Egypt is starting to throw
its weight toward educational reform for just this reason.
Modernization of the educational system in Egypt, as elsewhere,
will come about because influential social forces push for it, not
because x number of computers have been put in y number of
schools. Changes in the political economy can result in a context
that better supports reform, but even then reform will not happen
on its own. Working for educational reform requires not
machines but rather mobilization—that is, the
engagement of social actors to press for change, taking into
account the relevant political, economic, and cultural contexts
that help shape classroom learning and teaching.
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About the Author
Mark Warschauer is Vice Chair and Associate Professor of
the Department of Education at the University of California,
Irvine and the editor of Language Learning & Technology
journal. His research focuses on the uses of information and
communication technologies with culturally and linguistically
diverse learners. His most recent book is Technology and Social
Inclusion: Rethinking the Digital Divide (MIT Press, 2003). He
can be reached through his Website at http://www.gse.uci.edu/markw.
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