Introduction
Like
most districts, the Kenosha Public School District in
Southeastern Wisconsin faced a number of different
educational and fiscal challenges as the new millennium
approached. A medium-sized urban district in the Midwest,
Kenosha served a population of approximately 20,000 students
in the 2000-01 school year. Demographically, its student
population was 77 percent white with 11 percent Hispanic, 9
percent African American, and 2 percent other. Hispanics
represented the largest and fastest growing minority group.
About 30 percent of Kenosha's students lived in families
with incomes below the poverty level, as indicated by
eligibility for the federal free and reduced-price lunch
program. Over the past decade, the percentage of students
from low-income backgrounds continued to grow.
But, rather than being evenly distributed across all
schools, many of the district's low-income, minority and
limited-English-speaking students were concentrated in a
small number of its schools. Several years ago, it became
obvious that the growing concentration of educational
challenges that usually accompany these demographic
characteristics was making it more difficult for students in
these schools to achieve the high standards set for them by
the state and the district. Although a growing student
population, combined with a generous state education aid
program, helped ensure budget stability, the district
nevertheless struggled more and more to find the fiscal
resources required to deploy programs successful in boosting
the performance of its students, particularly its low income
and minority students.
In an effort to meet the achievement goals for all
students over the 1990s, the district implemented a number
of education reform initiatives. A new out-of-state
superintendent who arrived in 1996 stimulated these reforms,
plus, as will be shown, a number of related management and
fiscal changes. At the district level, the school system
shifted from a junior high to a middle school approach to
ease the transition into high school; opened three new
charter schools to help foster innovation and new
educational approaches; and most recently, implemented a
full-day kindergarten program, in part to help low-income
children learn to read in the early elementary grades. At
the site level, many schools began to adopt new, structured
literacy programs as well as comprehensive school reform
designs, such as Direct Instruction, Success For All, the
Literacy Collaborative, Marva Collins and Accelerated
Schools.
Although these reforms helped the district and its schools
make progress toward their student achievement goals,
teachers as well as district and school leaders wanted to
see even greater progress. One additional reform that
teachers and administrators alike believed would provide a
greater boost in student achievement was class-size
reduction.
Indeed, class size reduction, particularly in the early
grades, was an education reform sweeping the country during
this time. Odden and Picus (2000) found that 19 states and
scores of districts enacted various versions of this
education policy in the 1990s, believing that despite the
high cost, it was a policy that research showed could
dramatically raise student performance (Grissmer, 1999).
Further, Wisconsin had adopted a targeted class size
reduction program in 1995 as part of a statewide approach to
improve student performance, particularly the performance of
its low-income and minority students. Called the Student
Achievement Guarantee in Education or SAGE program, it was
initially limited to schools that had 50 percent or more of
its students eligible for free and reduced price lunch,
i.e., from a family with a poverty level income. In the
1996-97 school year, this included 30 elementary schools in
21 districts, including one school in Kenosha. For
the 2000-01 school year, the program expanded its
eligibility and had a dramatic increase in funding; in 2001,
it helped hundreds of schools afford smaller classes around
Wisconsin.
Although
there was strong support for a district-wide class-size-
reduction program, there was still the issue of how to
finance it. The expansion of the SAGE program provided one
source. But two additional factors helped the district
frame a strategy for how they could come up with the money
to fund such a high-cost education reform. First, a 1994
legislative change in the federal Title I program allowed
schools with at least 50 percent of its students in poverty
to use their Title I funds for school-wide programs, rather
than programs targeted to just its low-income students. The
school-wide programs selected had to be research-based, and
class-size reduction was a strategy that qualified. Second,
prior to the opening of the 1998-99 school year, district
administrators heard a presentation on resource reallocation
in education; one of the major ideas discussed was school
use of Title I funds for schoolwide programs, including both
class-size reduction and comprehensive school design models
(see, for example, Odden & Archibald, 2000).
The notion of resource reallocation for “whole school
reform” triggered thoughts about additional
programmatic and fiscal changes among many district and
school leaders. The general notion was that the district
could redesign schools from “the ground up” and
use all of a site's resources to finance a new, research-
based educational strategy, which could include small
classes in at least Kindergarten through grade three.
Further, a few elementary schools had access to other funds
that could help reduce class sizes. In addition to Title I
and the possibility of SAGE money, some elementary schools
qualified for a small state program, called P5, that
provided extra resources to schools with high poverty
concentrations (schools could either receive P5 or SAGE
money, but not both). In addition, the district knew that
at the federal level, Title VI of the reauthorized
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) would provide
an additional pot of money to help fund class-size
reduction.
A combination of the above ideas convinced the school board
in July 1998 that it could begin immediately to reduce class
size in a selected number of its high-poverty elementary
schools just by reallocating Title I (mainly to school-wide
programs) and P-5, and using SAGE and Title VI funds where
possible. They did so, and in the first year they saw a
positive impact on student academic performance as measured
by state and district tests.
In light of
the positive results at these elementary schools, as well as
even firmer belief in research supporting smaller classes
(Finn & Achilles, 1999; Molnar, Smith, Zahorik, Palmer,
Halbach & Ehrle, 1999, see also
http://www.uwm.edu/Dept/CERAI), the district decided to find
the money to reduce class sizes for Kindergarten through
grade three in all elementary schools the following
school year. Whether this was the reform that would best
help all students is beyond the scope of this study.
Instead, this case study tells the story of how the district
was able to fund this ambitious class-size reduction
initiative.
Finding the Money
Previous
research on resource reallocation (Achilles, 1999; Odden &
Archibald, 2000) showed that categorical program
dollars—Title I, special education, programs for limited-
English proficient students, etc.—comprised the bulk
of funds that were reallocated, whether the goal was class-
size reduction or implementing a specific whole school
design, such as Roots and Wings/Success for All. Kenosha
initially used this strategy as well, as it was primarily
federal Title I, Title VI, and state SAGE and P5 money that
allowed the highest poverty schools to begin to reduce class
sizes. Studies have shown that reduced class sizes are
especially beneficial for low-income and minority students
(Finn and Achilles, 1999).
Believing these benefits would extend to all students, the
district decided to reduce class sizes in all elementary
schools, including those that were not eligible for
categorical program funds, but to do so it needed a new,
larger source of funding. This challenge sent the district
back to analyze the workings of its overall budget as well
as the state of Wisconsin's school finance equalization
formula. These analyses also prompted the district to
consider implementing a full-day kindergarten program.
Although they had been considering this step for a long
time, this decision, combined with the reality of rising
student enrollments, helped the district generate the
resources that would enable it to fund a larger class-size
reduction strategy.
Funding for the larger class-size reduction initiative came
from two sources: rising enrollment and the implementation
of full-day kindergarten. In the next few paragraphs, these
funding sources will be addressed in turn. First, Kenosha
was able to generate resources from rising enrollments in
the following way: In Wisconsin, districts receive aid on
the basis of a three tiered, guaranteed tax base, school
finance formula. The state aid formula functions so that in
any one year, for each additional student Kenosha gains (or
loses), the district receives (or loses) approximately
$7000. Since the district has experienced rising
enrollments in the past few years, its budget has constantly
grown. And because each new student costs less than $7000
to educate, the marginal cost of educating each new student
is less than the average per pupil expenditure of the
district. To illustrate this point, assume the district
enrolls 25 new students. The district's budget would rise
by $175,000 (25 x $7000). But the district would have to
hire only one additional teacher for a new class of 25 kids.
This would require one teacher at an average cost of
$50,000, plus the cost of 20 percent of another teacher for
the first teacher's planning and preparation time, and some
additional costs for materials, supplies and operations and
maintenance. Assume these costs totaled $75,000. That would
leave the district with excess revenues of $100,000, which
would be sufficient for the district to hire close to two
additional teachers, at an average cost of $50,000 each.
The marginal costs for the additional 25 students were only
$3000 per student ($75,000 divided by 25 students), while
the average additional dollars were $7000 a child, for a
possible difference between average and marginal costs of
about $4000 a child.
To be sure, the above is a simplified analysis. For the
numbers to work exactly, all students would need to be in
the same grade level and in the same school. But since the
district enrollment grew by approximately 500 students
between 1999-2000 and 2000-01, a rise of 25 per grade was
possible, though maybe not in each school. For these
reasons, it may be true that the difference between average
and marginal costs for each additional student is not
precisely $4000. Even so, because of the high level of the
school finance equalization formula and the phenomenon of
rising enrollments, the district was in the enviable
position of generating substantial excess revenues for each
new student in the district. This situation was further
strengthened by the fact that the district had some excess
classroom space, so it did not need to build new classrooms
because of enrollment growth or because of class size
reductions. How the district found the space for the extra
classes will be discussed later in this case study.
Another complication for the above example is that
Wisconsin's education aid formula does not use the current
student count in determining each district's aid, but uses
the average of the number of students from the past three
years. Initially, this was implemented to limit state aid
losses for declining enrollment districts, but for growing
enrollment districts it limits the increase in revenues as
well. Thus, for Kenosha to enjoy the full measure of the
excess of average over marginal cost increases, it needed a
full three years. If this were the only source of new
funding, the district would have had to phase in its class
size reduction strategy over several years.
However, as previously mentioned, the district found another
way to raise revenue for the small class-size policy that
further aided all its students, but particularly its
students from low-income backgrounds, which was the
implementation of full-day kindergarten. In the mid-1990s,
the district provided only a half-day kindergarten program.
But it knew that full day kindergarten was desired by many
families and also was a research-based strategy to help
students from low-income backgrounds learn reading and
writing in the first three years of elementary school
(Slavin and Madden, 1996). Therefore, the district decided
to change from a half-day to a full-day kindergarten
program. This move generated more funds for class-size
reduction for the same reason identified with new
enrollments: having kindergartners for an extra half day
gave the district additional revenues because of excess
average over marginal costs. Because the state allowed the
district to count the child as a 1.0 student for a full-day
program as compared to 0.5 for a half-day program, the shift
to a full day program essentially allowed the district to
“increase” enrollments on its own. For every two
students who shifted from a half- to a full-day kindergarten
program, the district was able to add 1.0 (2 x 0.5) students
to its pupil count. It received the full $7000 for this
“extra” student, but again its marginal costs were
much lower than this $7000 figure.
Another example helps illustrate this point. When a school
has 20 students for morning kindergarten and 20 students for
afternoon kindergarten, the school receives 40 x 0.5 x
$7000, or $140,000. Assuming that the same teacher is
working in the morning and the afternoon, the school will
spend approximately $50,000 of that amount on the teacher's
salary and benefits, plus planning and preparation time,
materials, etc. which might total $65,000 - 70,000, leaving an
upper-bound estimate of $70,000 ($140,000 - 70,000) in
excess revenues.
When those 40 students change to spending a full day at
school, the school receives $7000 for each student, or a
total of $280,000. The school will now need to hire two
teachers, who will each have a class of 20 students, which
will cost about $140,000 ($100,000 for salary and benefits
plus additional money for planning time and materials).
This leaves $140,000 ($280,000-140,000) for other purposes,
compared to the $70,000 that was left when the 40 students
only attended for half a day. Because Kenosha had most of
the necessary classroom space, the district primarily needed
only to build in the cost of operating those rooms all day
to cover the expenses of essentially doubling the number of
kindergarten classes by moving to full-day kindergarten. As
is true with the growing number of students enrolled, the
marginal cost of educating kindergartners for a full day was
less than the average amount that they received via the
state equalization program, resulting in a net fiscal gain
for the district. Again, because of the three-year average
pupil count, these excess revenue numbers took three years
to be fully realized.
So the district was able to take advantage of two rising
enrollment phenomena to produce the revenues to help fund a
district-wide class-size reduction program—first,
excess revenues from naturally occurring enrollment
increases, and second, excess revenues from shifting from a
half-day to a full-day kindergarten program. When combined
with the initial categorical dollars that were used to
reduce class sizes first in the highest poverty-concentration
schools, Kenosha was able to fund dramatic
class size reductions without increasing taxes, eliminating
other programs, or increasing its average expenditure per
pupil.
Implementing the Class Size Reduction Policy
The two “new” revenue sources discussed in the
previous section made it possible for the district to help
fund reduced class sizes at all of its elementary schools,
but implementing this initiative was complicated. First,
because the excess revenues from shifting to a full-day
kindergarten program would be phased-in over a three-year
period, the superintendent initially advised the district to
slowly implement the class-size reduction policy, making
sure that the resources were there before putting the plan
into action. However, the board voted to move ahead
immediately because it felt that when their strategy for
finding the money to do so became public information, there
could be many other claims for its use—including
other programs as well as teacher salary increases.
Although class-size reduction was very popular with
teachers, the policy would be to reduce class size for just
kindergarten through grade 5, so teachers of other grades
could very well have had different ideas about how to spend
those dollars. Though the superintendent initially was
skeptical about moving so fast, he eventually came around
because he saw the wisdom of quickly implementing a popular
policy—class size reduction—and avoiding a
lengthy debate over alternative uses of the
“found” dollars.
In order to avoid the potential delay, district and board
leaders acted quickly. In July of 1999, the Kenosha school
board accepted the district proposal to fund 22 new teaching
positions to reduce class sizes for the following school
year. This meant that the district had just over a month to
hire all of these teachers plus the normal new hires for the
year. It managed to accomplish this task, hiring 37 new
teachers (22 for class-size reduction) in the one month
before school began in September. This was one of the
difficulties with trying to implement this initiative so
quickly.
The 22 new teachers were awarded centrally—schools
had to request these extra teachers from the office of the
superintendent and explain how they would be used to reduce
class sizes and what space they would use. Because the
district had staffed each elementary school on a 24 students
to 1 teacher basis, each school was required to use the new
teachers for class sizes below that level. Some schools had
the extra space, especially the high-poverty elementary
schools that had declining enrollment. Other schools had to
give up their art, music, or multipurpose rooms, which some
schools were reluctant to do. Some sacrifices had to be
made to implement this policy, but the district had made the
decision to reduce class size, and to do so they needed
classroom space. These initial new teacher positions helped
bring down class sizes somewhat, but district leaders had
begun to make long-term plans for formally reducing class
sizes even further, to specific target levels.
Over the course of the 1999-2000 school year, district
leaders had more time to plan the further reduction of
elementary class sizes in the Kenosha School District. This
time, they decided to reduce the staffing ratios for grades
K-5 rather than centrally award “extra” teachers
to the sites, which had produced a variety of different but
lower class sizes. This district-wide policy change made
the class-size reduction policy explicit for all elementary
schools.
As previously mentioned, the ratio that had been in place
was one teacher for every 24 students in grades K-5. In the
2000-2001 school year, with the new class-size reduction
policy in place, the ratios became 20 to 1 for K-3 and 23 to
1 for grades 4-5. These ratios were set in part according
to how many extra classrooms were available at the schools;
although district leaders would have liked to have even
lower class sizes, this was the level at which they felt
schools had the appropriate extra space to accommodate the
additional classrooms. The class size maximums also
changed. Previously, the maximums were 27 for kindergarten
through grade 3, and 29 for grades 4-6; under the new
allocation formula, maximums were set at 22 for kindergarten
through grade 3, and 25 for grades 4-5.
Further, in the past, when a class exceeded its maximum, an
instructional aide was placed in the classroom to provide
assistance. More specifically, if the class size was above
26 but not above 30, a half-time instructional aide was
provided; a full-time aide was provided if the actual class
size was over 30. But under the new, 2000-2001 class-size-
reduction policy and class-size maximums, most of the
resources for instructional aides were reallocated for the
additional classroom teachers that were necessary to keep
class sizes lower. The Assistant Superintendent of
Instruction stressed that the district had adopted an
overall value that, whenever possible, resources would be
used to employ fully trained and licensed teachers rather
than instructional aides. This decision was bolstered by the
fact that the same research that documented the
effectiveness of small classes also showed that adding an
instructional aide to a larger class provided no effect on
student performance (Achilles, 1999). Indeed, many of the
elementary schools that received Title I funds eliminated
instructional aides and used their Title I funds to hire
teachers instead. In Kenosha, it takes the resources for
about two full-time aides for a school to hire a licensed
teacher.
For the low-performing schools in Kenosha, class size
targets were set even lower than at the other elementary
schools. Kenosha defined low-performing by student
performance on the Wisconsin Knowledge and Concepts
Examination, a statewide testing system using the Terra Nova
commercial test. All schools with an average WSAS score
below the state average were categorized as “low-
performing.” Even before the district changed its
staffing allocation formula, these schools, because they had
the highest poverty concentrations, had access to all of the
previously mentioned categorical program dollars that could
be used to help fund class-size reduction: Title I, Title
VI, P-5 and SAGE.
The district class-size goal for low-performing, high-
poverty schools was set at 15, with a maximum of 18. This
maximum was set because schools receiving Title VI funds,
the federal class-size reduction program, had to reduce
class sizes to 18 or lower. Thus, the district class-size
goal for the low performing schools is lower than the
federal requirement. The extra funding from SAGE, Title I,
Title VI and P-5 that these schools received was used to
enable the district to reduce class sizes to 15 in many of
its low-performing schools. However, because there are more
low-performing elementary schools in the Kenosha School
District than resources to reduce class sizes to those
target levels, the district focused on reducing class size
to these low levels at the lowest performing schools first.
As of late 2000, the district had made significant progress
in reaching its lower class size goals. Of the 24
elementary schools in the district, one had class sizes of
15 or lower, eight more had class sizes of 18 or lower, 11
had class sizes of 20 or lower, and four had class sizes of
22 or lower. Thus, all elementary school class sizes were
below the maximum of 22 for grades K-3, and well below the
maximum of 25 for grades 4-5. Further, while only one high-
poverty school had an average class size of 15 or lower, all
elementary schools at which the majority of students are
low-income had class sizes of 20 or lower.
For many elementary schools, the combination of the new,
lower staffing ratio and the reallocation of categorical
funds has meant a dramatic reduction in class size and a
feeling of optimism about the subsequent effect on student
achievement. For example, at Wilson Elementary School,
where 86 percent of the students qualify for free or
reduced-price lunch, class sizes have been reduced from an
average of 21.9 in 1998-99 to an average of 16.4 in 2000-01.
In order to reduce class sizes that far, the school needed a
total of nine more classroom teachers in 2000-01 than it had
in 1998-99. The reduction in class size was possible
because of the change in the staffing formula and the
allocation of categorical funds for class-size reduction.
Enrollment growth does not explain any of the new teachers
for 2000-2001; Wilson had only 10 more students in that year
than in 1998-99. The school received three additional
teachers for 2000-01 because of the new staffing allocation
formula. The other six teachers were paid for with
categorical funds: one with other district funds for class-
size reduction, two with federal Title VI funds, 2.5 with
SAGE funds, and 0.5 from Title I. The district funds for
class-size reduction were the result of a board decision
that 30 new teachers would be hired for the 2000-2001 school
year; Wilson got one of those teachers. It is also
interesting to note that this had formerly been a P-5
school, but they traded in that status in order to qualify
for SAGE since they were able to hire more teachers with
those funds.
By concentrating many of its resources on class-size
reduction, Wilson was able to lower class sizes to an
average of 16 students. This is noteworthy because it is
within the range of 13-17 identified by the Tennessee STAR
study as being especially effective at raising student
achievement levels and producing other favorable outcomes
(Finn & Achilles, 1999; Grissmer, 1999).
Class sizes have also been significantly reduced at Vernon
Elementary School, where 36 percent of students qualify for
the free and reduced-price lunch program. Although this is
a significantly lower percentage than at Wilson, Vernon
still receives substantial categorical funding. As was true
at Wilson, it is this funding in combination with the
district's lower staffing allocation formula that has
allowed Vernon to reduce class sizes from an average of 27
in 1998-99 to an average of 18 in 2000-01. Enrollment has
stayed virtually the same over this time period; 468
students attended Vernon in 2000-01 as compared to 472 in
1998-99. Therefore, none of the 10 additional teachers on
staff at Vernon in 2000-01 can be explained by enrollment
growth. Instead, four of the teachers were a result of the
change in the staffing ratio from 24 to 1 to 20 to 1; one
was paid for using the additional district funds for class-
size reduction; one was paid for with federal Title VI
funds; three were paid for with Title I; and one with P-5
funds. By concentrating its funding sources on class-size
reduction, Vernon was able to reduce class sizes by a
remarkable nine students per classroom.
Initiatives Supporting Class Size Reduction
In addition to getting class sizes down to desired
levels, part of the implementation process is to provide
teachers with professional development that will help them
teach their small classes more effectively. Leaders in
Kenosha knew that research has shown that teachers can help
produce additional achievement gains when professional
development in small-class instruction is provided
(McRobbie, Finn & Harman, 1998; Bearl, 1998; U.S. Department
of Education, 1998). The Assistant Superintendent of
Instruction stressed the importance of this aspect of
implementation, and has continued to seek School Board
support for substantial investments in professional
development in order to help realize the potential of better
instruction in the smaller classes. Title VI, the federal
funding source for class-size reduction, allowed districts
to use 15 percent of its funding for professional
development in 1999-2000; although district administrators
thought this would be a good idea, the board voted to use
all the funds to pay for teachers in the first year.
However, for the 2000-2001 school year, districts were
allowed to use up to 25 percent of their Title VI funds for
professional development, and this time the board agreed, in
part because the funding had increased and they were able to
hire almost as many teachers and have money leftover for
professional development. The district was able to allocate
$137,000, or approximately 25 percent of the federal money
they receive for comprehensive school reform, toward
professional development programs designed to improve
instructional practices in small classrooms. This money
made it possible for 700 of the district's 1600
teachers to participate in such professional development
activities as Everyday Mathematics training.
Further, the district has continued to encourage all
schools to adopt some type of “whole school”
educational strategy to accompany both the above
professional development and small class sizes. For
example, for the 2000-2001 school year, the district
provided $299,000 in grants to schools without P5 or Title I
funds to help them afford various school reforms, including
comprehensive school reform models. This district's
commitment to raising student achievement scores is apparent
through the creative use of all of their funds to make
changes that they believe will boost student
achievement.
Monitoring Results
Although the superintendent and other district leaders have
made class-size reduction a priority in Kenosha elementary
schools, they recognize that it is just one reform to be
used in conjunction with other reforms for a common purpose:
to boost student achievement. For that reason, student
achievement scores are carefully measured and reported in
order to track the success of these reforms. In 2000-01,
students at Kenosha elementary schools took the Iowa Test of
Basic Skills (ITBS) in grades 2, 3, and 5; the Wisconsin
3rd grade
reading test, and the Wisconsin Knowledge and Concepts
Examination (WKCE) in 4th grade. The district
placed the most emphasis on the 3rd grade reading test
and WKCE. Each school had benchmarks that they were working
toward, which were set in terms of the percent of students
at proficiency level and the percent advanced. Awards were
given to schools that increased these percentages by five
percent annually.
Student achievement growth has been substantial at many
Kenosha Elementary schools, including Wilson, one of the
schools used as an example in the last section. In addition
to reduced class sizes, Wilson has used the principles of
the Marva Collins school design for the past few years, and
has more recently adopted Direct Instruction for reading,
and Core Knowledge as a curriculum guide. In the 1997-98
school year, only 17 percent of Wilson students were
considered proficient on the third grade reading test. In
1999-2000, 51 percent were at or above proficiency—a
dramatic improvement of 34 percentage points.
Columbus Elementary School, a school with 58 percent of
students who qualified for free or reduced-price lunch in
2000-01, has also made great strides. Funded by their
categorical dollars, Columbus has had reduced class sizes
for three years. The school chose class-size reduction
rather than a comprehensive school reform model, and is now
listed in the high achievement category for the WKCE in
Math. The state average score for percent proficient in
math is 52, and 68 percent of Columbus students scored at or
above proficiency (Barth, Haycock, Jackson, Mora, Ruiz,
Robinson, & Wilkins, 1999). This is the best indication so
far that the policy to reduce class sizes in Kenosha will
boost student achievement in all schools, as it has at
Columbus Elementary. In addition to Columbus and Wilson,
student achievement has risen at many other Kenosha schools,
in part due to initiatives like class-size reduction and
comprehensive school reform models.
Conclusion
Leaders in the Kenosha School District in Wisconsin managed
to significantly reduce class size in the majority of their
elementary schools—by creative resource reallocation
and deployment of all the revenues made possible by student
demographic characteristics and the state's school finance
system. In the 2000-01 school year, more than one-third of
Kenosha's elementary schools had class sizes of 18 or lower,
and all 24 schools had class sizes at or below 22. Although
individual schools in this district had begun to reduce
class size school-by-school by reallocating Title I and P-5
funds and using Title VI and SAGE, the district-wide change
to a lower elementary school staffing allocation formula
made sure that class sizes were reduced at every elementary
school, and to lower levels than the schools could have
afforded with just categorical dollar reallocation.
The major revenue source for this expensive policy was
excess revenues derived from the combination of growing
enrollment and the shift from a half-day to a full-day
kindergarten. For every new student, the marginal cost of
educating that student was approximately $3000 but the
district received an extra $7000 via the state school
finance formula, or an excess of average over marginal costs
of $4000 per child. The total combined district enrollment
growth from these two phenomena—natural growth and
kindergarten expansion—was about 500 students a year.
This produced excess revenues of nearly $2,000,000 (500
students times $4000/student), which was sufficient to hire
40 additional teachers at an individual cost of $50,000 in
salary and benefits. This quite ingenious way to fund
smaller class sizes, combined with additional dollars from
selected categorical programs—federal Title I and
Title VI, and state SAGE and P5—allowed for even
lower classes in the highest poverty, lowest performing
schools, reaching the level of 18 or lower in nine of the
district's 24 elementary schools. District leaders hope
that the positive results from Columbus Elementary School,
which has had lower class sizes in place for three years,
will be replicated in elementary schools district-wide.
This case shows how important it is for district leaders who
want to make changes using reallocated dollars to have full
knowledge of the district budget and how that budget is
derived. In Kenosha, district leaders decided to reallocate
categorical dollars to class-size reduction, but they needed
an additional source of funding to reduce class sizes to
target levels. They were able to find that additional
funding source because they understood the principle that
“new” students, whether from natural enrollment
growth or the shift from half-day to full-day kindergarten,
could produce “new” dollars because of the excess
of average over marginal costs. These changes enabled the
district to provide full-day kindergarten and reduce class
sizes in all elementary schools, initiatives that research
shows are particularly powerful in helping students from
low-income backgrounds learn to read and do mathematics in
the early elementary grades (McRobbie, Finn, & Harman,
1998; Slavin and Madden, 1996; Slavin, Karweit and
Madden, 1989).
Note
This article was prepared for the Consortium for Policy
Research in Education, Wisconsin Center for Education
Research, University of Wisconsin-Madison. The research
reported in this paper was supported by a grant from the
U.S. Department of Education, Office of Educational Research
and Improvement, National Institute on Educational
Governance, Finance, Policy-Making and Management, to the
Consortium for Policy Research in Education (CPRE) and the
Wisconsin Center for Education Research, School of
Education, University of Wisconsin-Madison
(Grant No. OERI-R3086A60003). The opinions expressed are those of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect the view of the
National Institute on Educational Governance, Finance,
Policy-Making and Management, Office of Educational Research
and Improvement, U.S. Department of Education, the
institutional partners of CPRE, or the Wisconsin Center for
Education Research.
References
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myth: High-poverty schools exceeding expectations.
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for more. Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin Press.
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About the Authors
Allan Odden
CPRE/WCER
1025 West Johnson Street, #653
Madison WI 53706-1796
Voice: 608 263 4260 Fax: 608 263 6448
Email: arodden@facstaff.wisc.edu
Dr. Odden is a Professor of Educational Administration at
the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and Co-Director of the
Consortium for Policy Research in Education (CPRE). His
areas of concentration are education policy, teacher
compensation and school finance.
Sarah Archibald is a Researcher in the CPRE offices of the
Wisconsin Center for Educational Research; her areas of
specialty are education policy, school finance and effective
resource use.
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